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RELIGION LESSONS FROM EUROPE:
INTOLERANT SECULARISM, PLURALISTIC
NEUTRALITY, AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
Antony Barone Kolenc*
ABSTRACT

Case law from the European Court of Human Rights demonstrates
to the U.S. Supreme Court how a pluralistic neutrality principle
can enrich the American society and harness the value of faith in
the public sphere, while at the same time retaining the vigorous
protection of individual religious rights.
The unfortunate
alternative to a jurisprudence built around pluralistic neutrality is
the inevitability of intolerant secularism—an increasingly militant
separation of religious ideals from the public life, leading
ultimately to a repressive society that has no room in its
government for religious citizens. The results of intolerant
secularism are seen in a recent series of negative cases decided by
the European Court, which illustrate how highly secularized
nations can trample the fundamental rights of religious citizens for
the sake of secular ideals. The Supreme Court can avoid this type
of intolerance in the United States by distancing itself from the
principle of strict neutrality that the Court often has repeated in its
Establishment Clause cases. A better path for the Supreme Court
is to emulate a series of positive cases from the European Court
that demonstrate pluralistic values. These cases show the value
that religion can bring to public life, and the ability of progressive
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nations to welcome religious diversity into the public square
without harming individual rights. The net result of this shift in
the Supreme Court’s focus—without sacrificing the value and
purpose of the Establishment Clause—would be to promote the
cause of religious pluralism in the United States, and to enhance
the dignity of the American people to live out their religious faith
in the community insofar as they choose (or do not choose) to do.
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INTRODUCTION

Post-Christian Europe—a secular, liberal society that is seen
as increasingly faithless1—has a few lessons to teach the United
States (“U.S.”) Supreme Court about the value of religion in modern
society. Recent cases from the European Court of Human Rights
(“European Court”) show that progressive, pluralistic nations can
tolerate religion in the public sphere without doing violence to
individual rights. Under the European case law, for instance, nations
may spend tax dollars on church projects, display religious symbols
in government buildings, and teach children about God in public
schools. These types of European cases may be instructive in
rethinking the U.S. Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause2
jurisprudence to create a more pluralistic neutrality principle for the
future.
Likewise, the European system demonstrates the dangers of
an increasingly intolerant strain of secularism that tramples personal
religious expression in the name of secular values. For instance,
under recent secular-based rulings from the European Court, Muslim
teachers cannot wear headscarves in Swiss public schools, Orthodox
Jewish butchers cannot access slaughterhouses in France, Christian
workers cannot claim conscience protection with regard to same-sex
marriage in the United Kingdom, and Islamic women may not wear a
1

See Christianity and Church Attendance: The Future of the World’s
Most Popular Religion is African, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 25, 2015),
https://www.economist.com/news/international/21684679-march-christianityfuture-worlds-most-popular-religion-african (noting dismal statistics of church
closings as “European priests and ministers are preaching to ever-emptier
pews”); see also Justice Antonin Scalia, Address at the 2007 Dinner at the
(Nov.
9,
2007),
Waldorf-Astoria,
ORD. MALTA AM. ASSOC.
https://orderofmaltaamerican.org/files/pages/0124newsletter_hospitallers_17_justice_scalia.pdf (calling modern Europe “totally
non-Christian”).
2
U.S. CONST. amend. I, cls. 1-2. The first and second clauses of the
First Amendment state: “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” Id. The first
portion of that sentence is known as the Establishment Clause; the remaining
words are known as the Free Exercise Clause.
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burqa in public in Belgium. These negative cases also can assist in
adjusting the Supreme Court’s religion jurisprudence so that
intolerant secularism does not strangle religious liberty in the United
States.
This Article argues that the Supreme Court can stay truer to
constitutional principles by embracing a more moderate
interpretation of the Establishment Clause—a pluralistic neutrality
principle. Pluralism refers to “a state of society in which members of
diverse . . . religious . . . groups maintain and develop their traditional
culture . . . within the confines of a common civilization.”3 In the
context of the Establishment Clause, a more pluralistic neutrality
principle would officially recognize the unique societal value of
religion and would permit the diversity of the nation’s faiths to
enrich the public sphere. This Article also contends that the Supreme
Court’s modern interpretation of the Religion Clauses has embraced
an unnecessarily strict model of neutrality, which is nurturing an
intolerant secularism that harms religious freedom.
These
contentious topics have been debated at the Supreme Court and in
the scholarly literature for decades.
This Article’s primary
contribution to that debate is its emphasis on pluralism and its focus
on European cases as a source of comparison and illumination.
Part II of this Article briefly sets forth two opening
principles: (1) that religion cases from the European Court can be
validly compared with the U.S. Supreme Court’s religion
jurisprudence, and (2) that religious freedom is critical in modern
pluralistic societies. Part III argues that the Supreme Court’s religion
jurisprudence sometimes has embraced an overly strict form of
neutrality, which naturally leads to the type of intolerant secularism
seen in some European nations. Then, using recent cases from the
European Court, Parts IV and V examine how the Supreme Court
can avoid the European Court’s acceptance of an intolerant
secularism that has trampled religious freedoms in some European
countries, while benefiting from a European-style pluralistic
3

Pluralism, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed.),
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/pluralism (last visited Aug. 25,
2017).
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neutrality principle. This Article concludes that the Supreme Court
should moderate its treatment of the Religion Clauses by adopting
more pluralistic European sensibilities.
II. OPENING PRINCIPLES: THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

The cases decided by the United States Supreme Court and
the European Court of Human Rights have been instrumental in both
helping and hindering religious freedom in the United States and
Europe. Part II examines why Europe is a good point of reference
for the U.S. Supreme Court on this issue, and explores why religious
freedom is worthy of protection as a key element in democratic
societies.
A. The European Court of Human Rights

Before delving into the subject matter of this Article, it is
necessary to mention why comparing the case law of the U.S.
Supreme Court and the European Court is a valid undertaking.
Although some have questioned the propriety of the Supreme Court
consulting foreign precedent,4 the author of this Article has
previously defended at length the validity of this practice in the area
of religion and the European Court, when done within cautious
limits.5 In short, although cases from foreign jurisdictions are not
4

See Austen L. Parrish, Note, Storm in a Teacup: The U.S. Supreme
Court’s Use of Foreign Law, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 637 (2007); Harlan Grant
Cohen, Note, Supremacy and Diplomacy: The International Law of the U.S.
Supreme Court, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 273 (2006).
5
See Antony B. Kolenc, Note, Putting Faith in Europe: Should the
U.S. Supreme Court Learn from the European Court of Human Rights?, 45 GA.
J. INT’L L. & COMP. L. 1 (2016). In that article, the author presents a full
explanation for why comparing the religion case law of the European Court and
the U.S. Supreme Court is a valid endeavor. The author considers policy-based
objections to the practice of citing foreign precedent, explores whether
differences between the systems in the U.S. and Europe invalidate the
comparison, and considers whether the subject matter of religion makes such
comparisons futile. The author concludes that there is value in consulting the
European Court’s religion jurisprudence. Id.
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binding on the Supreme Court, they may shed light on practices and
problems that parallel those seen in the United States. As Justice
Breyer has argued, cases that emanate from other developed
democracies may “cast an empirical light on the consequences of
different solutions to a common legal problem.”6
Considering the kinship of the United States and European
nations, it makes sense to turn to Europe for a natural point of
comparison. This is especially true of the European Court of Human
Rights. Located in Strasbourg, France, the European Court provides
a unique vantage point from which to view the religion issue.7 It
interprets the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”),8 helping to guarantee freedom of
religion across Europe. The primary source of religious freedom
under the ECHR is Article 9, which states:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom
of thought, conscience and religion;
this right includes freedom to change
his religion or belief and freedom,
either alone or in community with
others and in public or private, to
manifest his religion or belief, in
worship, teaching, practice and
observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion
or beliefs shall be subject only to such
6

Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
7
See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, arts. 20, 23(1), 26(1), 38, 41, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221
[hereinafter ECHR]. The Court consists of one judge from each member-state of
the Council of Europe, appointed to nine-year, non-renewable terms. It acts in
single-judge decisions, three-judge committees, seven-judge Chambers, or a
seventeen-judge Grand Chamber, and functions as both an appellate court and a
trial court. Id.
8
See generally ECHR, supra note 7. The ECHR—a human rights
constitution—may be “the most important element in the protection of human
rights in Europe.” Lord Goldsmith, A Charter of Rights, Freedoms and
Principles, 38 COMMON MAR. L. REV. 1201, 1209 (2001).

7
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limitations as are prescribed by law
and are necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of public
safety, for the protection of public
order, health or morals, or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms
of others.9
Article 9’s approach to religion approximates much of the
U.S. Supreme Court’s Free Exercise Clause case law, which applies
a mere rational basis scrutiny to neutral, generally applicable statutes
that do not target religion.10 This is similar to the European notion of
affirming laws that are “necessary,” such as those involving “public
safety” and “public order, health or morals.” Notably, Article 9 lacks
an Establishment Clause; however, that does not nullify the
comparisons with the Religion Clauses of the U.S. Constitution.
Indeed, the European Court has developed a “neutrality principle”
similar to—but more moderate than—that used by the U.S. Supreme
Court in its Establishment Clause jurisprudence.11 Moreover, even
though it decides relatively few religion cases in its vast docket,12 the
European Court grapples with many of the same religion issues that
confront the U.S. Supreme Court. In short, the points of similarity
justify the comparison.

9

ECHR, supra note 7, art. 9.
Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 (1990).
11
See Kolenc, supra note 5, at 23-24.
12
From 1959 to 2009, the European Court noted 30 freedom of
religion, thought, and conscience violations; however, “during that same fortyyear period, the Court found some 4008 violations . . . concerning the fairness
and length of proceedings.” John Witte, Jr. & Nina-Louisa Arold, Lift High the
Cross?: Contrasting the New European and American Cases on Religious
Symbols on Government Property, 25 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 5, 14-15 (2011) (2d
ed. Oxford Univ. Press 2010) (citing Pub. Relations Unit, 50 Years of Activity:
The European Court of Human Rights – Some Facts and
Figures (2010), http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Facts_Figures_1959_2009_
ENG.pdf); see also RUTH MACKENZIE, CESARE ROMANO & YUVAL SHANY WITH
PHILIPPE SANDS, THE MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 35.
10
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B. The Unique Value of Religion and Religious Freedom

Religion is unique among the fundamental human rights,
holding a special position in Western Civilization, Europe, and the
United States, in particular. Religious exercise is the nation’s “first
freedom,” occupying a place of “preferential treatment” in the
Constitution’s Bill of Rights.13 This noble lineage traditionally has
earned religion the right to be treated with respect and protected by
the state.
Various societal rationales support religion and religious
freedom—most important, religion is valuable in its own right
because it uniquely concerns “spiritual goods” and involves the
individual’s place in the universe in relation to a “divine or
transcendent authority.”14 In other words, religion is worthy of
protection for its own sake—it alone embraces the divine, spiritual
dimension of humanity, catering to the universal principles that have
animated human culture since the dawn of Man.15 Because religion
lays claim to the Divine, men and women throughout history have
been willing to die for it in the face of worldly persecution. Some,
no doubt, would add that people also have been willing to go to war
in the name of religion; however, that fact only emphasizes why a
pluralistic approach to religion and government is necessary to keep
the peace in a free, democratic society.
Less religious rationales have also been put forth to support
the value of religion and religious freedom: (1) a “civic virtue
rationale” that sees religion as instilling “in citizens the moral values
of traits of character necessary in a democratic social order;” (2) a
“personal autonomy rationale” that emphasizes “the importance of
religion to matters of personal choice and identity;” (3) a “civil strife
rationale” that notes how religious freedom helps “curb the
13

Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S.
384, 400 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
14
Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in
Constitutional Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 218 (1991).
15
See generally MIRCEA ELIADE, THE SACRED AND THE PROFANE
(Willard Trask trans., Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1987) (tracing the historical
manifestations of the divine from primitive to modern times).
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dissension and social conflict that issues of religion have historically
provoked;” (4) a “non-alienation rationale” that finds in religious
freedom a tool to help “citizens who adhere to minority religious
faiths or to none at all . . . feel like full members of the political
community;” and (5) a “pluralism rationale” that seeks a robust
religious freedom to ensure “a diversity of faiths, thereby
strengthening American pluralism.”16
Much has been written in the past century about the
significance of religious freedom. For the purposes of this Article,
three points are sufficient to highlight why religion is beneficial,
desirable, and even necessary to the success of constitutional
democracies.
First, with regard to the United States, the founding
generation intended religion to play an important role in making the
American experiment a success. This Article will not recount in
detail the repeated arguments by the scholars and Supreme Court
Justices who have set forth the historical case for religion’s accepted
role in official government actions.17 As a sampling of this historical
sentiment, recall that John Adams famously declared that the
Constitution would only be successful if it governed “a religious and
moral people;”18 the first Congress in 1789 believed that “religion,
morality and knowledge” were “necessary to good government and
the happiness of mankind;”19 and, when it came time for the
16

Smith, supra note 14, at 197 (discussing the various theories and
their scholarly underpinnings).
17
See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 885-912 (2005)
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-114 (1985)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
18
Letter from John Adams to the Officers of the First Brigade of the
Third Division of the Militia of Massachusetts (Oct. 11, 1798) (on file with the
National Archives).
19
See Act to Provide for the Government of the Territory Northwest of
the River Ohio, 1 Stat. 50-53 (July 21, 1789) (reenacting the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787, which contained the quoted language in Article III of its
text).
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Founders to identify America’s fundamental rights, freedom of
religion topped the list—not freedom of conscience.20 Moreover, to
support ratification of the Constitution without a Bill of Rights,
James Madison argued at the Virginia Convention that the pluralistic
nature of society would protect religious freedom from government
oppression.21 As Justice Scalia stated: “Those who adopted our
Constitution . . . believed that the public virtues inculcated by
religion are a public good.”22 Some contend, however, that the
evidence is not conclusive on this point.23
Second, religion has provided civilization with a solid
foundation for its most cherished human rights24 and secular

20

See Antony B. Kolenc, Not “For God and Country”: Atheist Military
Chaplains and the Free Exercise Clause, 48 U.S.F. L. REV. 395, 406-08 (2014)
(discussing the Congressional debate about the drafting of the Religion Clauses).
21
See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical
Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1479
(1990) (quoting Madison’s argument that pluralism “arises from that
multiplicity of sects which pervades America, and which is the best and only
security for religious liberty in any society; for where there is such a variety of
sects, there cannot be a majority of any one sect to oppress and persecute the
rest”); see also 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 330 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed.
1836).
22
Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S.
384, 400 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
23
See McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 878–79 (2005)
(cataloguing contrary historical evidence and arguing that “there was no
common understanding about the limits of the establishment prohibition, and
[Justice Scalia’s] conclusion that its narrower view was the original
understanding stretches the evidence beyond tensile capacity”).
24
See J.H.H. Weiler, Note, Freedom of Religion and Freedom From
Religion: The European Model, 65 ME. L. REV. 759, 767 (2013) (noting
historian, Remy Brague’s, finding that human rights “do not only derive from
the Enlightenment, Neo-Kantianism, and the French Revolution,” but that they
also have “always drawn” from religious sources).
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values.25 It was no accident that Thomas Jefferson referenced God
when he wrote the Declaration of Independence, proclaiming: “All
men are created equal and endowed by their Creator with certain
inalienable rights.”26 This appeal to a transcendent Creator
highlights the transformational benefit that religion brings to the table
in affirming human rights: “A transcendent source means that the
rights apply to everyone, even those who seem most alien, and that
society must take the utmost care when it treads close to these
rights.”27 Yet, some scholars today “define human rights and
religion in adversarial terms,” eschewing the religious foundation of
human rights and replacing it with purely secular bases.28
Third, accepting religion into the public arena as an
appreciated contributor to policy, education, and civic discourse
promotes democratic values. Far from ushering in theocracy, this
openness to faith enhances pluralism and diversity.29 For instance,
the U.S. Supreme Court, while noting the “Christian foundations of
the nation,” also recognized the nation’s “respect for freedom of

25

See Aaron R. Petty, Note, Religion, Conscience, and Belief in the
European Court of Human Rights, 48 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 807, 816-17
(2016) (recounting the role of Christianity in developing human rights and
secular values in Europe); Lori G. Beaman, Note, Battles Over Symbols: The
“Religion” of the Minority versus the “Culture” of the Majority, 28 J. L. &
RELIGION 67, 91-92 (2012-13) (noting the close connection between the
religious and secular).
26
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
27
Thomas C. Berg, Can State-Sponsored Religious Symbols Promote
Religious Liberty?, 52 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 23, 30, 32 (2013) (noting that
religious duty has value because it relates to an “authority above temporal
rulers”).
28
Zachary R. Calo, Note, Pluralism, Secularism and the European
Court of Human Rights, 26 J.L. & RELIGION 261, 272-73 (2010-11) (arguing
that religion has become an obstacle to human rights, and is no longer their
source or solution).
29
See Michael Scaperlanda, Secular Not Secularist America, 33
CAMPBELL L. REV. 569, 582 (2011) (“Those who claim that America is in
danger of theocracy misperceive the nature of theocracy, disagree with the
policy preferences of a certain set of Christians, or, more likely, both.”).
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religious practice that extended to other faiths as well.”30 This lesson
of tolerance is true today even in those European nations with an
established religion. For instance, many “deeply faithful” Europeans
reject the idea of a hostile secular society and would “prefer to live in
a country of pluralism that grants a more complete freedom of public
behavior even if [they] belong to a minority and have to support the
predominance of an established religion.”31
In sum, religion has served a valuable and unique role in
society, which should make it an indispensable partner in good
democratic government.
III. THE NEUTRALITY PRINCIPLE AND INTOLERANT SECULARISM

Although religious exercise historically has held an honored
place in the hierarchy of rights—“more important than most or
perhaps all other human goods”32—religion around the world has
come under increasing attack in the past century by an intolerant
secularism. The Supreme Court has fueled this secularism in the
United States through an inconsistent invocation of a strict neutrality
principle in the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
Neutrality is the touchstone of religion jurisprudence in both
the U.S. Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights.
Scholars have defined “neutrality” as “the quality or attitude of one
who maintains a distance from parties in a conflict.”33 But what does
that term mean in the context of state neutrality toward religion?
Does it require a stricter form of neutrality that removes all aspects of
religion from the public square for fear of offending non-adherents,
or does it allow for a more pluralistic neutrality principle that values
30

Berg, supra note 27, at 34 (citing Holy Trinity Church v. United
States, 143 U.S. 457, 458-59 (1892)); see also McConnell, supra note 21, at
1421 (discussing the state of religious diversity at the nation’s founding).
31
See Pierre-Henri Prélota, The Lautsi Decision as Seen from
(Christian) Europe, 65 ME. L. REV. 783, 786 (2013); see also Berg, supra note
27, at 34.
32
Smith, supra note 14, at 154-55.
33
Rafael Palomino, Note, Religion and Neutrality: Myth, Principle,
and Meaning, 2011 B.Y.U. L. REV. 657, 658 (2011).

13

56

PACE INT’L L. REV.

[Vol. XXX] 1N

the contributions of the spiritual as well as the secular goods in
society?
Part III of this Article explores the concept of neutrality in the
religion jurisprudence of the United States and Europe, and it
discusses how strict neutrality between church and state will
naturally lead to an intolerant form of secularism that harms religious
liberty.
A. The Neutrality Principle

In 1947, the U.S. Supreme Court created the neutrality
principle in Everson v. Board of Education (“Everson”), declaring
for the first time that the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment requires that government at the federal and state level be
“neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and
nonbelievers.”34 Since that time, in the name of this neutrality
principle, the Court has created an inconsistent mess that has left its
“Establishment Clause jurisprudence in shambles.”35 The Court’s
confused case law in this area has increasingly separated religious
faith from the public square, especially as the lower courts have
applied those precedents. In the process, the Court has strayed from
the Clause’s original meaning.36
34

Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
Utah High. Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 565 U.S. 994 (2011)
(Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of cert.); see also Peter G. Danchin, Suspect
Symbols: Value Pluralism as a Theory of Religious Freedom in International
Law, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 33-34 (2008); William P. Marshall, The Lautsi
Decision and the American Establishment Clause Experience: A Response to
Professor Weiler, 65 ME. L. REV. 769, 771 (2013).
36
Some scholars see little modern value in ascertaining the original
meaning of the Constitution. See Thomas B. Colby, A Constitutional Hierarchy
of Religions? Justice Scalia, the Ten Commandments, and the Future of the
Establishment Clause, 100 N.W. U.L. REV. 1097, 1103 (2006); Alexandra D.
Furth, Note, Secular Idolatry and Sacred Traditions: A Critique of the Supreme
Court's Secularization Analysis, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 594 (1998); Micah
Schwartzman, What If Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351, 1401
(2012). That debate exceeds the scope of this Article, which assumes the
original meaning should play a part in determining the proper boundary of the
Clause.
35
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This modern separationist interpretation of the Establishment
Clause ostensibly finds its roots in colonial-era thinkers, such as John
Locke,37 and Evangelical Christian leaders, such as Isaac Backus and
Roger Williams.38 But Locke was not a strict separationist—he
favored both governmental encouragement and financial support of
state religion.39 And while a few in the founding generation may
have preferred a more robust church-state separation,40 even those
voices would not recognize the world formed by today’s
Establishment Clause.
Nor did the Founders subscribe to the idea of strict neutrality
between religion and non-religion—meaning that the government
must remain entirely distant from religion. Justice Joseph Story’s
influential commentary on the U.S. Constitution reported that, at the
time of the Clause’s adoption, “the general, if not the universal,
sentiment in America was, that Christianity ought to receive
encouragement from the state, so far as was not incompatible with
the private rights of conscience, and the freedom of religious
37

See Scaperlanda, supra note 29, at 570-71 (citing John Locke, A
Letter Concerning Toleration, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A
LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 211, 226 (Ian Shapiro ed., 2003)) (“[T]he
church itself is a thing absolutely separate and distinct from the commonwealth.
The boundaries on both sides are fixed and immovable.”).
38
These figures favored a separation “to strengthen religion, not
marginalize it.” Marshall, supra note 35, at 778 (noting that Williams believed
aid would “weaken churches by fostering their dependence upon government
and subjecting them to ‘worldly corruptions’”); see also Scaperlanda, supra note
29, at 573 (noting Jefferson’s similar belief).
39
McConnell, supra note 21, at 1433; see also Scaperlanda, supra note
29, at 571-72 (noting the Constitution rejected Locke’s “intolerance of
Catholics, Muslims, and atheists . . . by stating that ‘no religious Test shall ever
be required’”).
40
George Mason, Virginia Declaration of Rights, in THE COMPLETE
BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 1.1.3.15.d
(“[I]t is contrary to the principles of reason and justice that any should be
compelled to contribute to the maintenance of a church with which their
consciences will not permit them to join.”); THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE:
ADDRESSED TO THE INHABITANTS OF AMERICA 36 (1792) (“Persecution is not an
original feature in any religion; but it is always the strongly marked feature of all
religions established by law.”).
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worship.”41 Most of the founding generation, including George
Washington, John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison,
recognized that the nation’s liberty required that its government have
some relation with religion in general.42
Further, some criticize the Everson Court’s decision to
incorporate the Establishment Clause against the states, turning it
into a vehicle for individual rights. They argue that the original
purpose of the Clause was to protect states from federal intrusion,
providing a “space of self-determination in the field of religious
freedom.”43 Thus, some states legitimately continued to have
established state religions for decades after the Clause’s

41

JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 1865, 1868 (1833) (noting that any state attempt to “hold all
[religions] in utter indifference, would have created universal disapprobation”);
see also Smith, supra note 14, at 150-66 (discussing the Framers’ religious
justifications for government).
42
See Scaperlanda, supra note 29, at 573; see also Andrea Pin,
(European) Stars or (American) Stripes: Are the European Court of Human
Rights’ Neutrality and the Supreme Court’s Wall of Separation One and the
Same?, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 627, 633 (2011). As President, both Jefferson and
Madison took actions to support a traditional understanding of the Clause. See
Christine Leigh Heyrman, The Separation of Church and State from the
American Revolution to the Early Republic, NAT’L. HUMAN. CTR.,
http://nationalhumanitiescenter.org/tserve/eighteen/ekeyinfo/sepchust.htm (last
visited Feb. 9, 2016) (Jefferson approved Congressional chaplains, granted
“financial aid to Protestant missions,” attended worship services in Congress,
and “called upon Americans to join him in prayer.”); see also Thomas E.
Buckley, S.J., Thomas Jefferson and the Myth of Separation, in RELIGION AND
THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, 46-48 (Mark J. Rozell & Gleaves Whitney eds.,
2017) (Jefferson permitting Marine Band to play in church, allowing religious
groups to worship in federal buildings, and advocating for religion among the
Native Americans); see also James Madison, Annual Prayer Day Proclamations,
in THE SACRED RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE 458-61 (Daniel L. Dreisbach & Mark
David Hall ed., 2009) (collecting Madison’s annual prayer day proclamations).
43
See Pin, supra note 42, at 628-29; see also Daniel O. Conkle, The
Path of American Religious Liberty: From the Original Theology to Formal
Neutrality and an Uncertain Future, 75 IND. L.J. 1, 1-2 (2000). The limited
scope of the Clause is evidenced by its rare invocation from the time of its
ratification in 1791 until 1947. See Witte & Arold, supra note 12, at 31.
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ratification.44 Justice Clarence Thomas and others have noted that
the Everson Court’s decision to incorporate the Clause45 was
unreflective;46 however, the Court does not seem ready to reverse
course on that matter.
The Supreme Court’s incorporation of the Clause opened the
“floodgates of litigation”—nearly 70 cases under the Clause over the
next 60 years, compared to only three cases in the prior 150 years.47
This resulted in a cascade of policy-based judicial decisions that
increasingly became disconnected from the Clause’s original
44

See McConnell, supra note 21, at 1436-37; Rupal M. Doshi, Note,
Nonincorporation of the Establishment Clause: Satisfying the Demands of
Equality, Pluralism, and Originalism, 98 GEO. L.J. 459, 467 (2010) (citing Carl
H. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment: The Church-State Settlement in the
Early American Republic, 2004 B.Y.U L. REV. 1385, 1458 (2004)) (noting that
Maryland, South Carolina, Georgia, and some New England states maintained
congregational establishments, with Massachusetts finally abandoning its
establishment in 1833).
45
The Court simply concluded that, because other parts of the First
Amendment had been broadly incorporated against the states, and due to the
“interrelation of these complementary [Religion] clauses,” there was “every
reason to give the same application and broad interpretation to the [Clause].”
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). The Court cited only to Thomas
Jefferson’s 1802 letter to the Danbury Baptists, describing the purpose of the
Clause as erecting “a wall of separation between church and state.” Id. at 16
(citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878)).
46
Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 50 (2004)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing the Clause should be “unincorporated”); Mary
Ann Glendon, Structural Free Exercise, 90 MICH. L. REV. 477, 481 (1991)
(noting “how little intellectual curiosity the members of the Court demonstrated
in the challenge presented by the task of adapting, for application to the states,
language that had long served to protect the states against the federal
government”); see also Doshi, supra note 44, at 462 (citing ROBERT L. CORD,
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION
15 (1982), and MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS:
RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 23-27
(1965)) (against incorporation).
47
See Witte & Arold, supra note 12, at 31; see also Doshi, supra note
44, at 471 (citing Cochran v. La. Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370, 375 (1930)
(upholding state purchase of nonreligious school books for students in parochial
schools); Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50, 82 (1908) (upholding payments to
a Roman Catholic school on an Indian reservation); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175
U.S. 291, 299-300 (1899) (upholding congressional payments to benefit the poor
at a religious District of Columbia hospital).
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purpose. Indeed, the Clause has evolved to the point where noted
scholars, such as Erwin Chemerinsky, can declare today without a
hint of irony that the Clause “is about preventing the majority,
through government power, from making members of other religions
feel unwelcome”—a theory of non-alienation that was foreign to the
Clause prior to 1980s.48 Of course, the idea that a pluralistic culture
should welcome people of all faiths rings true as a matter of social
policy; but, as a rule of constitutional interpretation, it lacks roots.
The Court opened the door to more litigation when it
concluded that the portion of the Clause that included the words,
“respecting an establishment,” required a strict judicial eye to prevent
even the slightest step in the direction of an establishment.49 This
slippery slope has led to judicial intrusion into even the slightest local
decisions.
Moreover, with no real moorings, the Court’s
jurisprudence has drifted aimlessly among various tests—neutrality,
Lemon, history and tradition, endorsement, coercion—resulting in a
herky-jerky precedent that provides few principled tools for lower
federal courts to determine when government action violates the
Establishment Clause.50 Predictably, confused lower courts have
become hyper-vigilant in policing state actions that historically posed

48

Erwin Chemerinsky, A Fixture on a Changing Court: Justice Stevens
and the Establishment Clause, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 587, 601-02 (2012); see also
Claudia Haupt, Active Symbols, 55 B.C. L. REV. 821, 829 (2014) (quoting Lynch
v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)) (“[T]he harm
against which the Establishment Clause is designed to protect is ‘send[ing] a
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community.’”); but see Smith, supra note 14, at 210 (explaining that
this rationale had “developed over the last decade” as “an effort to avoid the
failings of the . . . civil strife rationale”).
49
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (“A given law
might not establish a state religion, but nevertheless be one ‘respecting’ that end
in the sense of being a step that could lead to such establishment.”).
50
See Antony B. Kolenc, “Mr. Scalia’s Neighborhood”: A Home for
Minority Religions?, 81 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 819, 831-35 (2007) (discussing
various theories under the Clause); see also Haupt, supra note 48, at 829
(discussing the “coercion” approach, which would “find a practice with
‘coercive impact’ unconstitutional”).
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little danger to establishing an official religion.51 The result has been
the subversion of the democratic process52 and a string of
inconsistent rulings.53 Remarkably, these flaws have not stopped this
jurisprudence from influencing Europe.
The European Court of Human Rights has assimilated some
of the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence, even
though Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms contains no limitation on established
churches. In fact, key European nations—Denmark, Iceland,
Norway, the United Kingdom, and others—continue to have
51

See Selman v. Cobb Cty. Sch. Dist., 449 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2006)
(invalidating sticker on biology text that noted “evolution is a theory”); Skoros
v. City of New York, 437 F.3d 1 (2d Cir. 2006) (removing crèche, but allowing
Jewish and Muslim symbols); Carpenter v. Dillon Elementary Sch. Dist. 10, No.
04-35088, 2005 WL 2271720, at *647 (9th Cir. 2005) (banning individual from
giving secular message at school function because of known affiliation with
Christianity); Bannon v. Sch. Dist. of Palm Beach Cty., 387 F.3d 1208, 1211
(11th Cir. 2004) (upholding school’s removal of religious symbols in student
mural); Fleming v. Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918 (10th Cir. 2002)
(upholding school ban on religious text or symbols on painted tiles hung within
Columbine High School to commemorate shooting victims); Harris v. City of
Zion, 927 F.2d 1401, 1402 (7th Cir. 1991) (striking down two city emblems
because they portrayed religious imagery); Roberts v. Madigan, 702 F. Supp.
1505, 1518 (D. Colo. 1989) (prohibiting teachers from being seen reading or
possessing their own Bibles at school).
52
See Marshall, supra note 35, at 775-76.
53
Professor McConnell has compellingly demonstrated how this mess
of Establishment Clause cases has made it “constitutional for a state to hire a
Presbyterian minister to lead the legislature in daily prayers, but unconstitutional
for a state to set aside a moment of silence in the schools for children to pray if
they want to. It is unconstitutional for a state to require employers to
accommodate their employees’ work schedules to their sabbath observances, but
constitutionally mandatory for a state to require employers to pay workers
compensation when the resulting inconsistency between work and sabbath leads
to discharge. It is constitutional for the government to give money to religiouslyaffiliated organizations to teach adolescents about proper sexual behavior, but
not to teach them science or history. It is constitutional for the government to
provide religious school pupils with books, but not with maps; with bus rides to
religious schools, but not from school to a museum on a field trip; with cash to
pay for state-mandated standardized tests, but not to pay for safety-related
maintenance.” Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59
U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 134 (1992).
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officially established religions. Still, the European Court has created
and enforced a neutrality principle from the language within Article
9, and some scholars have argued that the European Court should go
even further in mandating a stricter rule.54 The major impediment to
a strict neutrality principle in Europe is the “margin of appreciation”
doctrine developed by the European Court. This is a principle of
deference to sovereign member-states based on the concept of
“subsidiarity,” which places primary responsibility for respecting the
ECHR with the member-states and allows the European Court to
intervene “only where the domestic authorities fail in that task.”55
Under these principles, the European Court has accepted that no
single model of church-state relations is “embedded in the European
Convention.”56 The net result of this policy is the European Court’s
frequent deference to member-states and its tolerance of a variety of
practices along the spectrum of policies: from strict neutrality in
nations like France to established religions in countries like the
United Kingdom.
The European Court’s development of a neutrality principle
may be a blessing in disguise—a source of illumination for the U.S.
Supreme Court, as this Article argues more fully below. Perhaps the
European Court can repay the Supreme Court’s contributions to
Europe in-kind, pointing the way to a more sensible interpretation of
the U.S. Establishment Clause.
B. Strict Neutrality and Intolerant Secularism

Although the European Court has adopted a moderated
version of the neutrality principle, the U.S. Supreme Court has sent
mixed signals about the kind of neutrality the Establishment Clause
54

See generally Alicia Cebada Romero, The European Court of Human
Rights and Religion: Between Christian Neutrality and the Fear of Islam, 11
N.Z. J. PUB. & INT’L L. 75 (2013).
55
European Court of Human Rights [Eur. Ct. H.R.], Interlaken FollowUp: Principle of Subsidiarity - Note by the Jurisconsult, at para. 2 (Aug. 7,
2010),
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2010_Interlaken_Followup_ENG.pdf.
56
Pin, supra note 42, at 640-41.
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requires. The Supreme Court has flirted at times with a stricter form
of neutrality, where the “government cannot utilize religion as a
standard for action or inaction.”57 The Court’s dicta in Everson first
referenced this idea, noting that the state may not “aid one religion,
aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.”58 The Court
has come closest to practicing strict neutrality in its cases involving
public schools and religious displays on government property, as
detailed below. Still, strict separationists—those who desire a
complete separation between church and state to be vigorously
enforced by the courts—believe the Court has not gone far enough in
applying a strict neutrality principle.59
The Supreme Court has not been consistent in applying strict
neutrality in the hard cases,60 yet its Establishment Clause
jurisprudence treats the concept as black-letter law. The Court has
stated that the “touchstone” of its Establishment Clause analysis “is
the principle that the ‘First Amendment mandates governmental
neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and
nonreligion.’”61 To that, a frustrated Justice Scalia responded,
“[H]ow can the Court possibly assert that . . . ? Who says so? Surely
not the words of the Constitution. Surely not the history and
traditions that reflect our society’s constant understanding of those
57

S. Kathleen Pepper, The Strict Neutrality Principle: Workable
Solution for First Amendment Challenges to Preservation Designation of
Religious Landmarks?, 15 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 3-4 (1991)
(citing PHILIP B. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW OF CHURCH AND STATE
AND THE SUPREME COURT 112 (1962)).
58
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
59
See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 688–89 (2002)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (lamenting the Supreme Court’s continued loosening of
its Establishment Clause jurisprudence, and noting that the Majority’s “espoused
criteria of neutrality in offering aid, and private choice in directing it, are shown
to be nothing but examples of verbal formalism”).
60
For instance, the Court has entirely ignored the neutrality principle in
the context of legislative prayer. See Town of Greece. v. Galloway, 134 U.S.
1811 (2014); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
61
McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005); see
also J. Judd Owen, The Struggle between “Religion and Nonreligion”:
Jefferson, Backus, and the Dissonance of America's Founding Principles, 101(3)
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 493, 493 (2007) (noting that this version of neutrality is an
embrace of John Rawls’s doctrine of “political liberalism”).
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words.”62
In reality, the consistent application of strict neutrality by the
Supreme Court would lead to the victory of an intolerant secularism
that could never be neutral toward religion. This is because strict
neutrality fancies itself to be fair and impartial, but it is “fair” to a
very great fault. It suffers from the same malady that Justice John
Paul Stevens famously criticized in applying strict scrutiny review in
equal protection cases: it cannot tell “the difference between a ‘No
Trespassing’ sign and a welcome mat.”63 In other words, strict
neutrality cannot distinguish between the types of government
interaction with religion that benefit society and the kind that pose a
danger (to both religion and government). Thus, it would suppress
all interaction.
Moreover, it is impossible for strict neutrality to be truly
neutral toward religion. This can be demonstrated with a logical
exercise. As defined earlier, “neutrality” is “the quality or attitude of
one who maintains a distance from parties in a conflict.”64 Thus,
referees are neutrals because they can maintain distance between
themselves and both sides on the playing field. To begin this
exercise, the parties must be identified. One may be tempted to label
the parties as “church” and “state,” recalling Thomas Jefferson’s
famous (but problematic65) phraseology; however, if those are the
two parties, then the state (as a neutral) must maintain a distance
from itself (as a party), which is clearly not possible. The parties’
identities must be found elsewhere.
The Supreme Court itself has identified the parties involved
62

McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 889 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Adarand Constrs. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (Stevens, J.
dissenting) (arguing that strict scrutiny cannot discern between benign and
invidious discrimination).
64
Palomino, supra note 33, at 658.
65
See Weiler, supra, note 24, at 760 (arguing the church-state
dichotomy is “a creature of the French and American Revolutions, which . . .
conflates State with Nation”). This language also adds tension between the
Religion Clauses and “prevents development of a single test that would allow
the two clauses to be read together harmoniously.” Pepper, supra note 57, at 6.
63
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by stating that the touchstone of the Establishment Clause is
neutrality between “religion and religion” and “religion and nonreligion.” The first of these two scenarios is partly achievable in
theory because it involves state neutrality between two religions.
Here, the state might find strict neutrality because it can “maintain a
distance” between itself and each religion, not preferring one over
the other. For instance, the state as a neutral would not provide a
program for Jews, to the exclusion of Catholics, because that action
would align itself with Jews over Catholics. Even this first scenario
raises problems, however, as illustrated by the debate between
Justices Souter and Scalia about whether the state can acknowledge
God in monotheistic terms.66
Much more problematic is the second scenario, involving
strict state neutrality between religion (in general) and non-religion.
If this simply means the state may not prefer religion over atheism,
or vice versa, then perhaps this works just as well (or as poorly) as
the first scenario’s theoretical construct. Except that, during the
entire history of the nation, the state has aligned itself with religion
by assuming the existence of a Creator who cares about the fate of
the nation and who has endowed humankind with inalienable
rights.67 As the Court declared in Zorach v. Clauson (“Zorach”):
“We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme
Being.”68

66

In the context of a Ten Commandments display, the Justices
discussed whether it would be impossible for the state to maintain neutrality
between monotheists and nonmonotheists when government “invokes God.”
Compare McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 879-80 (criticizing Scalia for allegedly
suggesting that “government should be free to approve the core beliefs of a
favored religion over the tenets of others”), with id. at 899-900 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (noting the state can invoke “God”—a monotheistic concept—
despite offending “nonmonotheists” because “governmental invocation of God
is not an establishment”).
67
Aleksandra Sandstrom, God or the Divine is Referenced in Every
State Constitution, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Aug. 17, 2017),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/08/17/god-or-the-divine-isreferenced-in-every-state-constitution/ (“God or the divine is mentioned at least
once in each of the 50 state constitutions and nearly 200 times overall.”).
68
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
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The true problem with the second scenario, however, is that
the Supreme Court does not view “non-religion” simply as atheism.
Instead, the Court has conflated non-religion with the concept of
“secularism,” which is defined as “the belief that religion should not
play a role in government, education, or other public parts of
society.”69 The Court has taken the position that the state must not
act in a way that intends to, or primarily does, benefit religion in
general.70 Under this test, the only permissible activity in the public
sphere becomes secular activity, and the state’s de facto position
becomes one of secularism. That being the case, how can a “secular”
state logically maintain strict neutrality between the parties of
religion and secularism? It cannot. The state can never maintain a
distance from religion without aligning itself with secularism; nor
can it maintain a distance from secularism without aligning itself
with religion.71
Further, secularism cannot be neutral toward religion because
it is an absolute-value, zero-sum system that requires religion to be
kept private, out of the public square and the schools and the halls of
power.72 Secularism is not pluralistic,73 nor can it embrace spiritual
gods along with secular ones in public works; to the contrary, it sees
69

Secularism, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed.),
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/secularism (last visited Nov. 3,
2017).
70
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
71
See McConnell, supra note 53, at 134 (noting that one side of the
Supreme Court’s view accepts a “role for religion in public life [if] . . . religious
institutions sacrificed their distinctively religious character.”).
72
See Robin W. Lovin, Religion and Political Pluralism, 27 MISS. C.
L. REV. 91, 104 (2007-08) (also noting that this is “a trivialization of religious
life”).
73
See generally John Breen, Neutrality in Liberal Legal Theory and
Catholic Social Thought, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, 513 (2009) (challenging
the idea of liberal neutrality); see also Owen, supra note 61, at 493 (questioning
whether the Court’s position is “cogent” in asserting that “liberal principles” can
be “neither religious or secular, but instead some third sort of thing—in Rawls’s
term, simply ‘political’”); Marshall, supra note 35, at 777 (finding secularism to
be “religiously-laden as it depends upon a particular view of the relationship
between church and state that comports with the beliefs of some religions but
not others”).
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secular values as superior to religious ones.74 If left unchecked, it
becomes increasingly intolerant, with adherents of both majority and
minority religions eventually marginalized by secular exclusivity and
denied “access to certain occupations, charitable work, and other
basic public goods, relegating diverse ways of life to an ever
shrinking private realm.”75 In the end, it leads to the “disintegration”
of the individual.76
To illustrate, the next part will demonstrate how intolerant
secularism has affected the religious rights of some Europeans
through some of the worst cases to emerge from the European Court
of Human Rights—negative lessons from Europe for the U.S.
Supreme Court.
IV. NEGATIVE LESSONS FROM EUROPE: THE EUROPEAN COURT AND
INTOLERANT SECULARISM

This Article has argued thus far that the consistent application
of a strict neutrality principle under the Establishment Clause would
lead to an intolerant secularism that would stifle religious expression
in the United States. That result would be unfortunate, especially in
light of the critical role that religion and religious freedom have
played in the success of the American experiment as a constitutional
republic. Further, this Article has suggested that the Supreme Court
can take lessons from how the European Court of Human Rights has
74

See McConnell, supra note 53, at 191-92 (also finding irony in the
claim that “liberal, democratic, nonsectarian positions have superior
constitutional status to religious ones” because that claim itself is “illiberal
(since it denies the people’s right to determine what will bring about the good
life), undemocratic (since it conflicts with the democratic choices of the people),
and sectarian (since it is based on a narrow point of view on religious issues)”);
see also Lovin, supra note 72, at 94 (arguing that a normatively pluralistic
society must show “mutual respect . . . [and] civility toward religious practices
and observances, even from those who . . . are skeptical of the social value of all
of them”).
75
Scaperlanda, supra note 29, at 576-77.
76
Id. at 575-79 (The secularist state “requires an unnatural separation
of the self-identified religious person’s core from their public persona, causing a
disintegration of the person. . . . [They] simply cannot think and act in a manner
consistent with secularism’s demand that they act as if God did not exist.”).
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adjudicated similar religious freedom issues. Not all of those lessons
are positive, however, and some cases exist to assist the Supreme
Court in avoiding the mistakes of the European Court.
Part IV of this Article first notes the varied church-state
arrangements adopted by European nations, to include those with a
form of intolerant secularism. It then discusses the European Court’s
difficult position attempting to referee disputes that pit secular values
against religious ones, and it examines cases where the Court has
failed to protect individual religious rights in the face of an
unyielding secularism. Finally, this part suggests a few lessons that
the Supreme Court can draw from those cases to avoid a similar
problem in the United States.
A. The European Court: Frustrated Referee of Neutrality

The European Court is the protector of religious liberty
within the Council of Europe, comprised of nations with varied
governing structures and church-state relationships—some with long,
distinguished histories.
For instance, the United Kingdom’s
(sometimes-troubled) marriage of church and state has stood for
centuries as a point of pride for the people of Great Britain, where
“the many Catholics, Muslims and Jews, not to mention the majority
of atheists and agnostics” are “equal citizens” who genuinely
consider the Queen to be their own, even though she is also “the
titular Head of the Church of England.”77 But some European
nations have taken the opposite approach, separating church from
state to different degrees.
Recall that the European Court has determined that no single
model of church-state relations is “embedded in the European
Convention.”78 In practical terms, this means that the 47 memberstates that comprise the Council of Europe are generally free under
the ECHR to structure their church-state relationships as they see

77
78
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fit.79 Some of those nations have tragic, bloodied histories where
religion has factored into wars and genocides.80 Thus, for some
member-states, the idea of state neutrality toward religion is a
concept with life-and-death ramifications. This reality has caused
some nations to take a harder stance on the separation of church and
state.
By working with these nations over time, the European Court
has gathered valuable experience with the disparate approaches taken
in the struggle for state neutrality toward religion. This neutrality
often is connoted by the French term, “laïcité,” or the Spanish word,
“laicidad”—both without direct English translation, but which refer
to a form of religious neutrality, maybe even secularism.81 France
stands out as the paradigmatic nation that most values its strong
secular government, evincing outright hostility toward religion in the
public square.82 Similarly, Turkey uses a strict form of laicidad “as a

79

“More important than separation of church and state, in the view of
the European Court of Human Rights, is that the state provide religious freedom
for all.” Melissa Curvino, Note, Church-State Cooperation Does Not Violate a
Guarantee of Religious Freedom: A Study of the 1978 Spanish Constitution and
1979 Concordat with the Catholic Church, 27 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 509, 560
(2013) (recognizing the legitimacy of non-neutral “[s]tate actions that do not
infringe on the right of citizens to worship freely”).
80
See Petty, supra note 25, at 807-08 (noting more recent European
“attempts at exterminating substantial parts of populations identified by their
religious difference: Armenian Christians, Ashkenazi Jews, and Bosnian
Muslims”).
81
See Michel Troper, Sovereignty and Laïcité, 30 CARDOZO L. REV.
2561, 2563 (2009) (“Laïcité cannot be completely defined by the usual idea of
an absence of influence of religion on the State or, as it is sometimes said, by a
separation between State and religion. But it can also be characterized as an
attitude of the State towards religion, decided unilaterally by the State.”).
82
See Weiler, supra note 24, at 763-64 (France is “neutral as between
different religious factions in the French public space. But it is not neutral in a
broader political sense. . . . The only things that may not be displayed,
independently of the contemporary color of voter preference, are a cross, a
mezuzah, or a crescent.”); see also Rebecca E. Maret, Left Hanging: The
Crucifix in the Classroom and the Continuing Need for Reform in Italy, 35 B.C.
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 603, 608-09 (2012) (noting that the French system
ensures freedom of religion and preserves “a political body free from the
influence of any one religious doctrine”).
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breakwater against the rise of Islamic fundamentalism.”83 Other
nations, such as Spain and Italy, try to maintain neutrality while also
respecting the place of religion in public life.84 The Vatican also has
advocated for a positive form of neutrality so that citizens may live
out their faith “in the public sphere.”85
It is important to recognize that even member-states with
established state religions (e.g., the United Kingdom) have taken
strong measures in modern times to separate temporal from religious
authority and to promote secular values.86 Indeed, many nations with
established religions go out of their way to encourage “neutrality” in
public life, except where necessary to maintain their ceremonial
establishments, which are more a part of their past culture than their
present religious practice.87 Thus, the mere existence of an
established church does not necessarily reflect the level of secularism
promoted by the nation’s civil government.
The European Court must resolve religion cases emerging
from all these diverse church-state arrangements. As a result, the
Court has become a referee of the disputes between the forces of
secularism and those who desire religious participation in public life.
The ability of the European Court to protect religious freedom has
been partly frustrated, however, by its need to apply a wide “margin
of appreciation” in these cases. This deference requires the Court to
83

Palomino, supra note 33, at 661-62.
Frederick Mark Gedicks & Pasquale Annicchino, Cross, Crucifix,
Culture: An Approach to the Constitutional Meaning of Confessional Symbols,
13 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 71, 98-99 (2014) (discussing how Italian laicità differs
from the French and American models).
85
Palomino, supra note 33, at 662 (quoting Pope Benedict XVI’s
advocacy for a ‘laicidad positiva’ in Italy).
86
See Petty, supra note 25, at 813-15 (noting historical need to separate
temporal and religious power in Europe).
87
For instance, the United Kingdom, like much of Europe, has had
steadily declining church attendance, according to surveys. See Report of the
Commission on Religion and Belief in British Public Life, WOOLF INST. 89 (Dec.
7, 2015), https://corablivingwithdifference.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/livingwith-difference-community-diversity-and-the-common-good.pdf
(“The
percentage of people who say they do not attend religious services rose from 49
per cent in 1990 to 56 per cent in 2010.”).
84
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uphold a member-state’s action unless it conflicts with the ECHR
directly or with the European consensus on a particular issue of
religious freedom.88 The net result of this deferential policy is the
Court’s toleration of a variety of offending practices taken in the
name of secularism.
Truth be told, part of the explanation for these poor results is
that the European Court itself largely has embraced secular values,
sometimes accepting the notion that religion is “more a problem . . .
than a solution,” and that religious pluralism can be sacrificed in
“cases that challenge the predominance of this secular narrative.”89
This is especially the case in decisions where the “threat” of religion
conflicts with secular values under the ECHR, which the European
Court implies are “more important to the human rights agenda” than
religious freedom.90
A sampling of cases in the next section demonstrates how
intolerant secularism in Europe has trampled the rights of religious
persons (often from minority religions) in the name of secular values.
These cases stand as negative examples where the European Court’s
compromised and frustrated position has caused it to fail in its
mission to protect religious liberty in Europe.
B. Europe’s Toleration of Intolerant Secularism

This section will discuss four paradigmatic cases where the
European Court has failed to protect religious liberty in the face of
intolerant secularism. To understand the situation better, consider
the steps taken by the European Court to adjudicate Article 9 claims
under the ECHR:

88

European Court of Human Rights [Eur. Ct. H.R.], Interlaken FollowUp: Principle of Subsidiarity - Note by the Jurisconsult, at para. 2 (Aug. 7,
2010),
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2010_Interlaken_Followup_ENG.pdf.
89
Calo, supra note 28, at 268.
90
Carolyn Evans, Individual and Group Religious Freedom in the
European Court of Human Rights: Cracks in the Intellectual Architecture, 26
J.L. & RELIGION 321, 341 (2010-11).
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[T]he Court will assess: (1) whether
there is interference with that right;
(2) whether this interference was
based on law; and (3) whether this
interference was necessary in a
democratic society. It is usually the
third step, the balancing test by the
Court, which is the focus of most
cases. There the judges analyze
whether the interference corresponds
to a pressing social need, is
proportionate to the aim pursued, and
is justified by relevant and sufficient
reasons.91
The third step of the Court’s Article 9 analysis is also the
place where the judges weigh the importance of the secular values at
stake against the desire for religious expression. This is where the
European Court sometimes falls short, undervaluing religion relative
to secular beliefs. Indeed, when that Court has failed to protect
religious pluralism, it has done so “where religion challenges
Europe’s secular identity in a manner that the Court deems
threatening.”92
The first two example cases involve France, to which the
European Court regularly defers without questioning that country’s
“elevated position of secularism.”93 The “neutrality” of this
secularism is intended in theory to result in the fair and even-handed
treatment of religion by the state. In reality, however, the strict
separation between church and state often places France at odds with
its people on matters of religious practice—especially the wearing of

91

Witte and Arold, supra note 12, at 16.
Calo, supra note 28, at 264 (citing to cases involving Muslim
headscarves).
93
Id. at 336 (discussing the Court’s tendency to defer to the
representations of longstanding members of the ECHR).
92
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holy garb.94 This results in conflict between French secular values
and the religious practices of minority adherents who wish to live
according to their rules of faith. As these cases demonstrate, the
European Court appears to identify with the secular values of French
culture, prizing them above the deeply held religious values of
politically powerless individuals.
In S.A.S. v. France (“S.A.S.”), the most controversial case in
this area, the European Court upheld a French ban on the wearing in
public of any item that covers the face—a not-so-veiled attack on
Islamic clothing, such as the burqa worn by some Muslim women.95
The European Court first rejected France’s justification that the
burqa ban protected women from symbols of gender oppression.96
On this point, France was not helped by the fact that the applicant (a
feminist Muslim woman) insisted she wore the burqa by choice,
based on her own religious feelings at any given time.97 This placed
France in the odd position of arguing that it was promoting gender
equality as a means of protecting women “from the exercise of their
own fundamental rights and freedoms.”98 The Court also found
France’s asserted national security rationale to be weak, unlike in
some other cases.99 Instead, the European Court applied the margin
of appreciation principle to uphold the ban on a much weaker legal
94

See, e.g., Mann Singh v. France, App. No. 24479/07, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2008) (finding a Sikh’s complaint “manifestly ill-founded” after he was denied
a driver’s license due to his wearing of a turban in a photo, based on France’s
interest in public safety and due to the increased risk of fraud and forgery of
driving licenses).
95
S.A.S. v. France, App. No. 43835/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 163
(2014).
96
See id. para. 119.
97
Id. paras. 11-12.
98
Id. para. 119.
99
Compare id., with Ahmet Arslan & Others v. Turkey, App. No.
41135/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010) (The Court ruled against secular Turkey’s
conviction of 127 Turks who violated an anti-terrorism law about “the wearing
of headgear and . . . religious garments, in public other than for religious
ceremonies.” Although the Court found a violation of Article 9, it noted that it
would have “accepted, particularly given the importance of the principle of
secularism for the democratic system in Turkey, that this interference pursued
the legitimate aims of protection of public safety,” except Turkey never offered
that justification in the case.).
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theory based on society’s secular values.
Specifically, the S.A.S. Court found that the ban protected
“the rights and freedom of others” by furthering the secular good of
“social communication”—a “principle of interaction between
individuals” that was “essential for” pluralism, “tolerance and
broadmindedness.”100 In this sad irony, in the name of tolerance, the
European Court accepted the intoleration of a diverse religious
minority’s desire to express its faith in public in a peaceful, nonthreatening manner. The case—already a precedent for cases from
Belgium101 and Switzerland102—shows how difficult it is for a strictneutrality system to be truly neutral toward religion, especially where
secular values clash with religious ones and the state chooses sides
against religion.
In a second French case—Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v.
France (“Cha’are Shalom”)—the European Court again upheld
French values in rejecting a challenge from the applicant, an ultraorthodox Jewish group.103 To further its animal cruelty laws, France
had denied the group a license to use a state-approved facility for the
ritual slaughter of its own meat, in compliance with Jewish “glatt”
kosher standards.104 France had already licensed a much larger
Jewish association to use the slaughterhouse, and it claimed that the
nation’s secular goal of minimizing animal cruelty would be
100

S.A.S., App. No. 4385/11, para. 153.
Similar Muslim veil laws were upheld in Belgium on the same
secular principles as in S.A.S. v. France. See Dakir v. Belgium, App. No.
4619/12, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2017); see also Belcacemi and Oussar v. Belgium, App.
No. 37798/13, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2017).
102
See Osmanoǧlu & Kocabaş v. Switzerland, App. No. 29086/12, Eur.
Ct. H.R. (2017) (citing S.A.S v. France, App. No. 4385/11 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2014))
(finding no violation in a school’s refusal to exempt Muslim girls from
compulsory mixed swimming lessons, despite interference with religious
freedom, due to margin of appreciation and secular aim of protecting foreigners
from social exclusion).
103
Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France, 2000-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. at
para. 88.
104
Id. para 32 (“For meat to qualify as ‘glatt’, the slaughtered animal
must not have any impurity, or in other words any trace of a previous illness,
especially in the lungs.”).
101
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furthered by avoiding “a proliferation of approved bodies” to conduct
ritual slaughtering105—a position that, in reality, did not help even a
single animal.106 France insisted that the group either purchase its
glatt meat from another country (Belgium), or obtain it from the
already-licensed Jewish association, despite the group’s insistence
that the association did not sufficiently comply with glatt standards to
fulfill their deeply religious obligations.107
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the Cha’are Shalom
case was that France ignored the group’s assessment of its own
religious beliefs, finding instead that the group’s ritual slaughtering
was “only religious in an accessory way.”108 France also argued that
the group’s religious beliefs included only the eating of the “glatt”
meat, not necessarily the slaughtering of it.109 Incredibly, the
European Court fully approved this characterization of the group’s
beliefs, noting that Article 9 did not “extend to the right to take part
in person in the performance of ritual slaughter” where the applicant
could obtain and eat the needed meat.110 The Court’s value
judgment about this religious slaughtering was improper because
“only the religious community has the competence to define and to
interpret its religious beliefs and their implications for its religious
freedom.”111 This case illustrates again that secularism cannot
remain neutral toward religion where secular values clash with
religious ones, even where, as here, France’s position would do little
to further its goal of protecting animals from cruelty.
A similar disturbing result occurred in Dahlab v. Switzerland
105

Id. para. 69.
The same number of animals would be slaughtered in the same
slaughterhouse, whether done by the politically powerful Jewish association or
the smaller orthodox applicant. No animals would be saved or treated less
cruelly.
107
See id. paras. 81-82.
108
Id. para. 69.
109
Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France, 2000-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. at
para. 64.
110
Id. para. 82.
111
Gerhard Robbers, Church Autonomy in the European Court of
Human Rights--Recent Developments in Germany, 26 J.L. & RELIGION 306
(2010-11).
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(“Dahlab”), where secular education regulations prevented a female
teacher (a Swiss Catholic convert to Islam) from wearing an Islamic
headscarf (hijab) while teaching students in a public school class,
even where she had not discussed religion with the students.112 A
chamber of the European Court accepted Switzerland’s view that the
hijab was a “powerful external symbol” of religion that might have a
“proselytizing effect” on “the freedom of conscience and religion of
very young children.”113 Moreover, unlike in S.A.S., both the
Government and the European Court found the headscarf offensive
to the secular value of “gender equality.”114 Citing the margin of
appreciation, the Court found the application inadmissible, and it
affirmed that the Swiss could “protect the right of State school pupils
to be taught in a context of denominational neutrality.”115 The
Dahlab case reveals that secular systems cannot tolerate a religious
“good” (i.e., individual expression of faith) where it clashes with a
secular “good” (i.e., the state’s view of “gender inequality”).116 This
unyielding “neutrality” is typical in secular systems.117
Finally, in the consolidated case of Eweida and Others v.
The United Kingdom (“Eweida”), a chamber of the European Court
upheld state action based on the U.K.’s highly secularized modern
view of religious freedom.118 In a case involving age-old moral
beliefs about traditional marriage, two of the applicants were
Christian employees who opposed same-sex partnerships on
religious grounds, and whose consciences prevented them from
112

See generally Dahlab v. Switzerland, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001).
Id. at 450.
114
Id. at 463 (finding the hijab to be “imposed on women” by the
Quran and finding it “difficult to reconcile” its wearing with the “tolerance,
respect for others and, above all, equality and non-discrimination” required in
school).
115
Id.
116
Evans, supra note 90, at 331.
117
See Berg, supra note 27, at 35 (“[N]ations that rest religious
freedom on a highly secular rationale have been unsympathetic to the basic
claims of citizens to manifest their belief in state schools in a non-coercive
manner.”).
118
Eweida & Others v. The United Kingdom, 2013-I Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2013).
113
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taking official actions that furthered such relationships. The first
applicant—a Christian counselor at a privately owned relationship
counseling group—was dismissed for “gross misconduct” under the
company’s “equal opportunity” policy because he had referred samesex relationship cases to his co-worker counselors.119 Similarly, the
second applicant had worked for the U.K. government as a marriage
registrar.120 After a policy change required her to register same-sex
civil partnerships, she made informal arrangements with co-workers
to do those registrations for her.121
When two colleagues
complained, her supervisors ordered her to perform the
registrations.122 Both of these employees’ attempts to accommodate
their beliefs on the job led to their dismissal from employment.123
In its decision, the European Court cited the usual margin of
appreciation rationale and sided with the U.K. in both cases, finding
no consensus in Europe regarding the proper balance between
conscience and accommodations regarding same-sex relationships.124
The Court found that the state could place greater value in the secular
“good” of affirming sexual orientation diversity rather than the
religious “good” of following one’s conscience.125 This once again
demonstrates that secular values inevitably will marginalize religious
ones, “relegating diverse ways of life to an ever-shrinking private
realm.”126 The illusion of neutrality is again dispelled.
In Part V, this Article argues that some European Court cases
promote a pluralistic neutrality that the U.S. Supreme Court should
emulate. Those cases will focus on the state’s right to acknowledge
the value of religion in public life. In contrast, the cases discussed in
this Part have involved direct state suppression of individual liberties.
119

Id. paras. 31-37.
Id. para. 25.
121
Id. para. 26.
122
Id.
123
Id. paras. 27-28, 37.
124
See Eweida & Others v. The United Kingdom, 2013-I Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2013). The Court did note, however, that “differences in treatment based on
sexual orientation require particularly serious reasons by way of justification.”
Id. para. 105.
125
Id.
126
Scaperlanda, supra note 29, at 576-77.
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In each case, secularized nations denied the rights of citizens
attempting to exercise their beliefs peacefully in public. Nor did the
European Court—the frustrated referee of these values—protect
those citizens from the arm of the secular state;127 it instead affirmed
secular goods over religious ones. These European decisions provide
an opportunity for the U.S. Supreme Court to avoid the natural result
of accepting an intolerant secularism, as discussed in the next
section.
C. Secularism Lessons for the U.S. Supreme Court

What can the U.S. Supreme Court learn from the four
negative European Court cases discussed in the prior section? First,
it should recognize that embracing the French-style “neutrality”
inevitably would lead to the suppression of religious expression in
the United States. Second, the Supreme Court should realize that its
jurisprudence interpreting the Religion Clauses has been heading in
the same direction as Europe by embracing values that will lead to an
intolerant secularism in America, if it does not alter that path.
Finally, the Court should find that there is another way—a pluralistic
neutrality principle—that can accommodate and affirm the good in
religion while still respecting the rights and freedoms of people of all
faiths, or no faith at all.
With regard to strict neutrality, the Supreme Court should
take heed of the natural path of intolerant secularism discussed in
Part III. As seen in the above European cases, that progression is
especially true in a nation like France, where the strict separation of
church and state is part of the fabric of that nation’s structure.
France’s trajectory demonstrates that a truly secular state must
sanitize the public space of religious activity; yet, as France is
experiencing, that practice itself harms society because it is
“profoundly disturbing” to the human condition to shut out
“religiously grounded beliefs . . . in the public debate over the
127

See Petty, supra note 25, at 824 (noting the European Court is “more
concerned with the role of the state in religious affairs than with the rights of
individuals,” and it views religion as a private rather than public way of life).
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issues,”128 especially in light of the tradition of Western Civilization.
Further, the Supreme Court should recognize that the French way is
not the American way. The secular “model of the relationship
between church and state” that was “spread across Europe by the
armies of Napoleon, and reflected in the Constitution of France . . . is
not, and never was, the model adopted by America.”129 Indeed, that
model cannot succeed easily in the United States, where society
traditionally has been much less secular than in France.130
Second, the Supreme Court should see that the negative
European case examples above are only a step away from being
decided similarly under the Supreme Court’s own religion
jurisprudence, which at times elevates secular values to the exclusion
of religious liberty. This is partly due to the Court’s strict-neutrality
Establishment Clause jurisprudence; however, it also relates to Free
Exercise Clause cases after the Court’s controversial decision in
Employment Division v. Smith.131 In particular, Free Exercise Clause
analysis now resembles the European Court’s Article 9 ECHR
process by merely requiring that the state possess a rational reason
for regulating neutral activity that impacts religion.132 Thus, as in
Europe, if the state provides a neutral justification for a rule—such as
protecting public health, safety, or morals—and applies that rule in a
generally applicable way, without targeting religion, then the U.S.
Supreme Court is likely to uphold that law regardless of its impact on
religion.
Indeed, the four negative European Court cases discussed
above are not far-removed from those already decided under the U.S.
128

Scaperlanda, supra note 29, at 586.
McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 886 (2005)
(Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Prélota, supra note 31, at 787 (“The aim of
separation in France is to protect the State—and the individuals—from religions;
the aim of separation in America is to protect freedom of religions through a
strict equality.”).
130
See Smith, supra note 14, at 169-78 (disputing that the U.S. became
more secularized among common people in the 20th Century, and suggesting this
perception is due to the secularization of some of the elite class).
131
Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 (1990); see Kolenc, supra
note 50, at 840-42 (discussing the controversy surrounding Smith).
132
Id.
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Constitution. While the United States has not banned the wearing of
a burqa in public, the U.S. military may ban religious garb while in
uniform to enhance standardization.133 While Jewish groups have
not been prevented from slaughtering meat, U.S. states may ban
peyote to further their war on drugs, even though peyote is a major
part of sacred Native American sacraments.134 While Muslim
teachers may wear a hijab in class, school districts may force
Christian teachers to keep their Bibles out of sight for fear of state
endorsement of religion.135 And, in the name of toleration, the state
may penalize public servants and private businesspersons with
religious principles when their moral consciences prevent them from
supporting same-sex marriage ceremonies.136
The Supreme Court must come to see that the chaotic path its
religion jurisprudence has taken, especially with regard to the
Establishment Clause, is leading to the embrace of strict neutrality as
a working principle, especially in the lower courts.137 Justice Scalia
warned of this danger in his dissent in Locke v. Davey, where he
connected the trajectory of France with the Supreme Court’s own
133

See Goldman v. Weinberger, 473 U.S. 503 (1986) (rejecting claim
of an Air Force officer wishing to wear a Jewish yarmulke while in uniform; the
Department of Defense later permitted this accommodation via regulation).
134
See generally Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (using rational basis review in
Free Exercise claims).
135
See Roberts v. Madigan, 702 F. Supp. 1505, 1518 (D. Colo. 1989).
136
See Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 370 P.3d 272 (Colo. Ct. App.
2015) (affirming cease and desist order and monetary penalties against Colorado
bakery that refused to bake a wedding cake for a same-sex marriage), cert.
granted, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Com’n, 137 U.S. 2290 (Jun.
26, 2017); see also Miller v. Davis, 123 F. Supp. 3d 924 (E.D. Ky. 2015)
(granting injunction against public official who refused to issue marriage
licenses due to religious objections; clerk jailed for contempt of court during
process).
137
See Dillon Elementary Sch. Dist. 10, No. 04-35088, 2005 WL
2271720, at *647 (9th Cir. 2005) (banning individual from giving secular
message at school function because of known affiliation with Christianity);
Bannon v. Sch. Dist. of Palm Beach Cty., 387 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2004)
(upholding school’s removal of religious symbols in student mural); Fleming v.
Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918 (10th Cir. 2002) (upholding school
ban on religious text or symbols on painted tiles hung within Columbine High
School to commemorate shooting victims).
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jurisprudence that allowed unequal treatment toward religion:
[R]ecall that France has proposed
banning religious attire from schools,
invoking interests in secularism no
less benign than those the Court
embraces today. . . . When the
public’s freedom of conscience is
invoked to justify denial of equal
treatment, benevolent motives shade
into indifference and ultimately into
repression. Having accepted the
justification in this case, the Court is
less well equipped to fend it off in the
future.138
Finally, the Supreme Court should look for a new direction to
avoid the victory of intolerant secularism. To accomplish this,
however, it must re-evaluate its religion cases—especially with
regard to the Establishment Clause—and recognize that the banner of
strict neutrality has backfired. There must be another way: perhaps a
Europe-inspired path based on a more pluralistic type of neutrality.
That is the focus of the remainder of this Article.
V. POSITIVE LESSONS FROM EUROPE: THE CASE FOR PLURALISTIC
NEUTRALITY

Part IV discussed why the European Court of Human Rights
(“European Court”) is not always effective in protecting religious
liberty, especially when secular and religious values clash. When the
European Court has succeeded in protecting religion, however, the
key has been its appreciation for “normative religious pluralism”—a
recognition that religious diversity can be “a positive force in social
life,” which can give “moral and spiritual depth to civic
discourse.”139 A similar respect for pluralism can help the U.S.
138

Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 734 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(protesting the Court’s decision upholding a program in Washington State that
excluded only theology degrees from generally available scholarship funding).
139
Lovin, supra note 72, at 91.
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Supreme Court moderate its view of the Religion Clauses to avoid
intolerant secularism and promote free exercise of religion.
In Part V, this Article first contends that religious pluralism
can serve as a unifying constitutional principle to protect religious
freedom in both the European and American systems. It then
marshals cases from the European Court to illustrate how progressive
modern societies can respect the diversity of faith among their people
while not excluding religion from the public square. It does this by
comparing these European cases with the approach adopted by the
U.S. Supreme Court in its religion jurisprudence, especially in the
areas of public aid to religion and public acknowledgment of
religion, including the topics of religious symbols, prayer, and
education. Although much more can and should be said on these
topics as scholarly debate continues in the future, this Part offers
some initial insights on these European lessons.
A. Pluralism as a Unifying Constitutional Principle

The European Court “repeatedly speaks of pluralism as the
sine qua non of a democratic order, the full and proper expression of
liberal freedom.”140 This is consistent with the work of those
scholars who have argued that the ideal of religious pluralism can
serve as a future model to protect religious freedom around the
globe.141 Positive cases from the European Court show how a robust
human rights system based on pluralism can succeed in progressive

140

Calo, supra note 28, at 261-62.
For instance, Professor Peter Danchin has argued that “value
pluralism” could be a model used in international law to protect religious
freedom through “a plurality of collective subjects asserting claims of right.”
Danchin, supra note 35, at 15. He makes the case that governments around the
world should use “public measures to promote or protect the religious or cultural
beliefs and identities of specific majority and minority groups,” resulting in the
state providing “the same sort of rights to minorities that are taken for granted
by the majority.” Id.
141
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societies—even in nations that join church with state.142 Therefore,
the U.S. Supreme Court should look to Europe for inspiration to
reform its approach to the Religion Clauses: that is, to develop a
better, more pluralistic neutrality principle.
Over the past sixty years, the European Court has created its
own version of the neutrality principle as it has “evolved”143 the
rights contained in the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms. While the U.S. Supreme Court’s religion
cases may have influenced Europe on this front—after all, the text of
the ECHR contains no semblance of an establishment clause—the
European Court’s neutrality principle developed along much more
moderate lines than those embraced by the Supreme Court.144 This
is mostly because the European Court views pluralism as the
“cornerstone of a human rights regime”—a value that fosters “liberal
goods such as respect for diversity and toleration,” and “nourishes
the health of democratic life.”145 But why should Europe’s view of
pluralism be stronger than in America?
Even more so than Europe, the United States historically has
been at the forefront of protecting religious liberty. The First
Amendment made the free exercise of religion the nation’s first
142

See Curvino, supra note 79, at 512-13 (arguing that “a movement
toward the establishment of one religion does not necessarily infringe upon the
religious freedom of another,” and citing Spain to demonstrate how state
“cooperation with religious denominations is a good thing because it helps them
use their religious freedom more effectively”).
143
Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou & Conor O’Mahony, Evolutive
Interpretation of Rights Provisions: A Comparison of the European Court of
Human Rights and the U.S. Supreme Court, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 309,
315-16 (2013) (“[I]n spite of its acceptance on a judicial level, evolutive
interpretation of the ECHR remains susceptible to many of the same academic
criticisms that have been leveled at its use in relation to the U.S. Constitution.”).
144
It is unlikely the European Court will ever assimilate a French-style
secularism into its more moderate neutrality principle because France’s version
of secularism is “less appealing to—indeed, is opposed by—nations that have an
interest in preserving a national identity steeped in religious historical tradition.”
Maret, supra note 82, at 608-09.
145
Calo, supra note 28, at 263 (Religious pluralism “is not one
democratic virtue among many. It is the cornerstone of a human rights regime
and the norm by which other norms are to be assessed.”).
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“protected class” from government discrimination. Moreover, from
the beginning, the First Amendment viewed religion as something
special—specifically protecting it, while rejecting a proposed
broader protection for all rights of conscience.146 Europe, on the
other hand, offered the ECHR’s protections to both religious and
non-religious practices of conscience.147 Even prior to passage of the
Bill of Rights, the U.S. Constitution went out of its way to protect
freedom of religion by stating that “no religious test shall ever be
required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the
United States.”148
Nor is pluralism a new concept in the United States, which, at
the time of the ratification of the Constitution, “had already
experienced 150 years of a higher degree of religious diversity than
had existed anywhere else in the world.”149 Protestants of all
varieties, Catholics, Jews, and others lived side-by-side, fighting for
common causes. The Constitution’s “religious-test” prohibition was
itself a victory for religious diversity because it ensured “a much
richer and deeper pluralism” by “welcoming into the cacophony of
political and civil life the religious voices” of many faiths, “alongside
their Protestant brothers and sisters.”150 The Framers lived in a
world that recognized religious diversity and that understood the
need to keep the state neutral toward religion’s many represented

146

The Framers excluded conscience rights from protection under the
Religion Clauses by rejecting a version of the First Amendment that would have
protected more than just religion. See Kolenc, supra note 20, at 406-07.
147
See Statute of the Council of Europe pmbl., May 5, 1949, 87
U.N.T.S. 103, 104 (1951); MACKENZIE, supra note 12, at 329-30 (outlining the
“[f]reedom of thought, conscience and religion”); see also ECHR, supra note 7,
art 10. The ECHR also expressly protects against violations of related rights,
such as freedom of expression, freedom from discrimination, and freedom of
parents to educate their children on religious matters. See ECHR, supra note 7,
arts. 14, 26, and Protocol 1, art. 2.
148
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
149
McConnell, supra note 21, at 1421.
150
Scaperlanda, supra note 29, at 571-72.
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views,151 while at the same time accepting the importance of religion
(in general) in public life—a pluralistic neutrality.
In short, history makes clear that the concept of pluralistic
neutrality is not a novel theory. It undoubtedly shares common
ground with the position of “accommodationists,”152 “nonpreferentialists,”153 and those who advocate for a “legal coercion
test.”154 All three of those theories stem from a similar desire to
define neutrality so that it ensures the “impartiality of the state with
regard to all religions, but not a distancing from religion [in
general].”155 Further, those theories all reject the Supreme Court’s
on-again, off-again relationship with strict neutrality, recognizing
that a state that accepts religion in the public sphere will further
religious freedom by embracing a “constructive process of exchange
and critique within faiths, between faiths, and between religious and

151

In Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878), the Court
first invoked Thomas Jefferson’s language about “a wall of separation between
church and state,” from his 1802 letter to the Danbury Baptists. Yet, even in that
context, the Court clearly did not intend that as an embrace of strict neutrality
because the Court also accepted James Madison’s monotheistic use of the term
“religion,” which he described as “the duty we owe the Creator.” Id. at 163
(quoting Madison’s “Memorial and Remonstrance,” Semple’s Virginia Baptists,
Appendix).
152
Danchin, supra note 35, at 34 (arguing that U.S. “value pluralism”
uses a Judeo-Christian “accommodationist approach that takes into account not
only the role of religion generally, but also the role of the religion of the
majority in particular, in the public life and history of the nation and its
institutions of government”).
153
See generally Douglas Laycock, “Nonpreferential” Aid to Religion:
A False Claim About Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 875, 878 (1987)
(rejecting non-preferentialism as inconsistent with the Founders’ debates about
the Religion Clauses, finding that “the Framers . . . believed that nonpreferential
aid would establish religion”).
154
Those who advocate for such a test view the Establishment Clause
as primarily directed toward prohibiting the “coercion of religious orthodoxy
and of financial support by force of law and threat of penalty.” Elk Grove
Unified Sch. Dist., 542 U.S. 1, 50 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting L.
LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 4 (1986)). This is similar to the “actual
coercion” test advocated by Justice Scalia in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 577
(1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
155
Palomino, supra note 33, at 678-79.
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non-religious traditions of thought.”156
Whereas intolerant secularism takes sides against religion,
requiring “the religious person to leave her deepest self and most
profound commitments at home as a price for admission to the public
square,”157 pluralistic neutrality is inclusive. A truly pluralistic
approach to neutrality welcomes both secular and religious ideas. It
works not “to associate religious pluralism in human rights with a
creeping theocratic impulse;” but, instead, to draw “religion into a
conversation about the moral structure of modernity.”158 In a
democratic and pluralistic society, where the government “mirror[s]
the culture as a whole,” natural notions of neutrality should “lead to a
broadly inclusive public sphere, in which the public is presented a
wide variety of perspectives, religious ones included.”159 Such a
society also makes accommodations for religion because “[w]ithout
respect for the differences of religious communities from general
secular behavior, pluralism would be an empty word.”160
As the rest of this Article illustrates, pluralistic neutrality is a
theory that the European Court has put into practice in several key
cases. And while that Court has sometimes failed to live up to its
pluralistic rhetoric,161 a survey of some positive European Court
cases can provide important lessons for the U.S. Supreme Court.
More specifically, those cases can point the way to a better path—
156

Calo, supra note 28, at 277.
Scaperlanda, supra note 29, at 586.
158
Calo, supra note 28, at 278 (noting also that “no single tradition,
religious or secular, is to monopolize political discourse over the meaning of
shared public goods”); see also Scaperlanda, supra note 29, at 587 (“The middle
way between theocracy and secularocracy consists of a secular state influenced
profoundly and organically by the deeply pluralistic culture that surrounds it and
supports it.”).
159
McConnell, supra note 53, at 193; see also Scaperlanda, supra note
29, at 586 (“True, thick, robust, and unafraid pluralism welcomes the whole of
every person into the public debate.”).
160
Robbers, supra note 111, at 281, 306.
161
Evans, supra note 90, at 342 (The Court still has “substantial work”
to do “in creating a robust concept of pluralism and applying it in a meaningful
way. . . . The Court is too ready to move to the limits of pluralism without
serious engagement with what a pluralistic society would look like . . . .”).
157
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one that interprets the Constitution’s Religion Clauses in a more
moderate fashion, with a neutrality principle that both enhances
religious pluralism and affirms religion in general.
B. Pluralistic Neutrality and Public Aid to Religion

Regarding the issue of public funding for religious
organizations, the U.S. Supreme Court already has begun to learn
from Europe, within the undeniable strictures that the Establishment
Clause places on the use of taxpayer dollars. This is an area where
the modern Supreme Court has rejected an overly strict version of the
neutrality principle, and recently has settled on a more pluralistic,
commonsense approach that allows for public funding of religion as
part of neutral, generally available programs. Yet, despite positive
developments in this area over the past three decades, there is room
in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence for further growth.
1. Undeniable Limits on Lessons from Europe

The European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”) contains no establishment clause;
moreover, several of its member-states continue to fund official state
religions. In contrast, the Framers undoubtedly intended the
Establishment Clause to place limits on the funding of religion in the
United States. As Justice Scalia explained: “[B]y 1790 the term
‘establishment’ had acquired an additional meaning—‘financial
support of religion generally, by public taxation’—that reflected the
development of ‘general or multiple’ establishments, not limited to a
single church.”162 Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court has reached broad
consensus on the idea that the Establishment Clause (at least) forbids
the state from expending “significant amounts of tax money to serve

162

Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 640-42 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted).
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the cause of one religious faith.”163 Due to this crucial difference
between the two systems, there always will be a constitutional ceiling
on how far the Supreme Court can go in allowing European-style,
direct funding of religion.
For instance, Ásatrúarfélagid v. Iceland (“Iceland”) involved
the National Church of Iceland, which the state supported through a
tax system that distributed “parish tithes” to one’s home parish and
provided the national church additional funds for its duties, salaries,
and obligations required under law.164 A minority religious group,
which honored the ancient Norse gods, filed a complaint seeking a
comparable additional tithe for its own support.165 Notably, the
group did not challenge the legitimacy of the parish tax system,
instead agreeing that “[b]y providing registered religious associations
with parish charges, based on income tax of individual citizens, the
State of Iceland is actively protecting the members’ rights to practise
their religion.”166 The European Court ultimately found the group’s
application to be inadmissible as “manifestly ill-founded” because
Iceland had provided a reasonable explanation for its need to pay
extra tithe money to its national church.167 A similar result occurred
in a more recent German tax case.168
The Iceland case offers a key lesson for the U.S. Supreme
Court: the Norse religious group—though it was a minority religion
163

County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 660, 664 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 840 (1995) (“The
apprehensions of our predecessors involved the levying of taxes upon the public
for the sole and exclusive purpose of establishing and supporting specific
sects.”).
164
Ásatrúarfélagid v. Iceland, App. No. 22897/08, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2012).
165
See id.
166
Id. para. 130.
167
See generally id.
168
See Klein & Others v. Germany, App. Nos. 10138/11, 16687/11,
25359/11, & 28919/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2017) (finding no violation of Art. 9 by
law that permitted state involvement in levying special fees/taxes on church
members).
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in a nation with an established church—recognized that Iceland’s tax
system benefited society by enhancing religious pluralism. Despite
this insight, however, there can be no doubt that the Establishment
Clause would act as a ceiling on this type of tax system in the United
States, even under pluralistic neutrality. Iceland directly supports a
specific sect with taxpayer funds—a practice that strikes at the core
of the Establishment Clause. Some lessons from Europe rightly will
dead-end at un-crossable barriers in the U.S. system.
2. Public Aid and the Supreme Court’s European Excursion

Over the past thirty years, the U.S. Supreme Court’s religion
cases have inched ever closer to the European Court’s model of
accepting public aid for religion. From the beginning of the Supreme
Court’s modern religion jurisprudence, the Justices have struggled to
figure out how far the Establishment Clause should go in banning
public funding of religion. Even in Everson, the Court approved a
program that allowed New Jersey to expend tax dollars on bus fares
for Catholic students.169 While acknowledging that the tax funds
would encourage some families to send their children to religious
schools, Justice Hugo Black’s majority opinion explained in dicta
why the state could use tax dollars to benefit religion in many
common funding programs:
Similarly, parents might be
reluctant to permit their children to
attend schools which the state had cut
off from such general government
services as ordinary police and fire
protection, connections for sewage
disposal, public highways and
sidewalks. Of course, cutting off
church schools from these services, so
separate and so indisputably marked
off from the religious function, would
make it far more difficult for the
schools to operate. But . . . the First
169

See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1947).
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Amendment . . . requires the state to
be a neutral in its relations with
groups of religious believers and nonbelievers; it does not require the state
to be their adversary.170
The Court’s dicta in Everson recognized, at least in theory, a
less-strict neutrality principle that could tolerate spending tax funds
on religion through generally available, neutral government
programs. In the following decades, however, the Court struck down
numerous such aid programs, most notably in Lemon v. Kurtzman,
where the Court erected its controversial three-pronged test to
determine when state action violates the Establishment Clause.171
During this period, the Court struck down several publicly funded
programs172 while upholding a few expenditures that conferred
merely “‘indirect,’ ‘remote,’ or ‘incidental’ benefit[s] upon religious
institutions,”173 or that posed little threat to the principles of the

170

Id.
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (striking
programs funding teachers for religious schools). The Lemon test requires laws
to meet three requirements: “First, the statute must have a secular legislative
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive
government entanglement with religion.’” Id. at 612 (citations omitted).
172
See Sch. Dist. of City of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 393
(1985) (striking community education program), overruled by Agostini v.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (striking
funds for guidance counseling, speech, and hearing services); Comm. for Pub.
Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771 (1973) (striking a
program for maintenance and repair costs); Levitt v. Comm. for Pub. Educ. &
Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973) (striking funds for teacher-prepared
tests).
173
Sch. Dist. of City of Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 393.
171
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Establishment Clause.174
Starting in the 1980s, however, personnel changes on the
Supreme Court led to the creation of a new conservative majority,
which began to embrace a more European-style pluralistic neutrality
principle around public aid to religion. The Court began upholding
far-reaching benefit programs that resulted in generally available tax
funds flowing to religious institutions,175 culminating in the approval
of a school voucher program in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris.176 With
Justice Neil Gorsuch filling the seat of the late Justice Antonin
Scalia, this flexible approach has continued, as shown by the Court’s
most recent decision in this area.
In Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer
(“Comer”), the Court— in a solid 7 to 2 decision— reaffirmed that
the Constitution does not prevent states from giving direct tax funds
174

See Walz v. Tax Com. of City of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970)
(upholding religious property tax exemption, noting room in the Religion
Clauses “for play in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which will
permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without
interference”). This “benevolent neutrality” was referenced by the Court only
three other times, most recently in 1994, and on two of those occasions, the
Court cited it only while striking down a tax program that aided religion. Bd. of
Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 705 (1994)
(striking city accommodation for Jewish group); Corp. of Presiding Bishop of
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 327
(1987) (upholding religious exemption to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act);
Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. at 792 (striking financial
aid grants to religion).
175
See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (upholding program
that allowed religious schools to borrow “secular” educational materials and
equipment); see also Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819 (1995) (upholding tax funds to print student group’s religious
magazine); see also Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993)
(upholding tax funds for sign-language interpreter at religious school); see also
Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Servs. for Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (upholding
blind student’s subsidy at religious school); see also Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S.
388 (1983) (upholding state tax deductions for religious educational expenses).
176
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding
Cleveland’s school voucher program for needy students, even though the tax
funds were used overwhelmingly by parents for tuition at private religious
schools).
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to churches as part of a neutral, generally available public benefit.177
Indeed, the Court accepted as settled law under the Establishment
Clause that Missouri could provide direct public funding to a
religious preschool to build a playground for children, even though a
church fully owned that school.178 More significantly, the Comer
Court took a revolutionary step forward by concluding that the Free
Exercise Clause required the state to provide those direct funds to
religion, as long as the church qualified for the money under neutral
criteria set forth under the program.179
As the Supreme Court has moved toward a more pluralistic
neutrality in this area, the example of Europe has not been lost on
individual Supreme Court Justices. Some Justices have noted the
success of government aid to religion in such diverse European
church-state models as the United Kingdom and France. Indeed, this
is an area where Justices Breyer and Scalia— great minds on both
ends of the ideological spectrum—have debated and found common
ground. Breyer, whose dissent in Zelman decried the constitutional
validity of school vouchers, indicated during one such debate that he
had become “uncertain” about the validity of his Zelman dissent
because “in France they subsidize a religious school and it isn’t the
end of the earth. And the same thing is true in Britain, [and] other
countries.”180
Remarkably, Justice Scalia—who vehemently
opposed the practice of U.S. judges consulting foreign case law—
agreed that it would be appropriate to look to Europe “to show that if
177

Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct.
2012 (2017) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part).
178
None of the seven Justices who voted in favor of the church
indicated any concern with the constitutionality of providing the public funds
under the Establishment Clause. Instead, the Court noted: “The parties agree
that the Establishment Clause of that Amendment does not prevent Missouri
from including Trinity Lutheran in the Scrap Tire Program.” Id. at 2019.
179
See id. at 2021 (finding that “disqualifying [a church] from a public
benefit solely because of their religious character . . . imposes a penalty on the
free exercise of religion that triggers the most exacting scrutiny”).
180
Full Written Transcript of Scalia-Breyer Debate on Foreign Law,
FEDERAL
NEWS
SERVICE
(Jan.
13,
2005),
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/ 1352357/posts (referencing Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 717-29 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
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the Court adopts this particular view, the sky will not fall. You
know, if we got much more latitudinarian about our approach to the
Establishment Clause, things won’t be so bad. . . . It’s useful for
that.”181
In fact, the Supreme Court still has room for growth in
moving closer to Europe without violating the strictures of the
Establishment Clause, as Justice Gorsuch intimated in his concurring
opinion in Comer. He took issue with the Court’s apparent openness
to “the possibility [that] a useful distinction might be drawn between
laws that discriminate on the basis of religious status and religious
use.”182 Gorsuch argued that the Establishment Clause would
allow—and that the Free Exercise Clause would require—the state to
distribute neutral funds to a church even if the money would be spent
furthering a religious mission.183 He asked:
Is it a religious group that built the
playground? Or did a group build the
playground so it might be used to
advance a religious mission? The
distinction blurs . . . . Neither do I see
why the First Amendment’s Free
Exercise Clause should care. After
all, that Clause guarantees the free
exercise of religion, not just the right
to inward belief (or status).184
This position would break the prevailing notion in some
circles that the Establishment Clause requires the state to ensure that
religious groups spend public funds solely on secular uses. Gorsuch
would not care how the church spent the money; he would focus
only on whether the state distributed generally available funds using
neutral criteria.
181

Id.
Comer, 137 S. Ct. at 2025 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part).
183
Id. at 2025-26.
184
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct.
2012, 2025-26 (2017) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part).
182
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Justice Gorsuch is correct. If a neutral state program neither
establishes a state religion nor takes a step in that direction, why
should the Establishment Clause care if some religious causes are the
collateral beneficiaries of those generally available funds? The
model of Europe demonstrates that, under the right conditions,
individual religious liberty can thrive even where the state funds an
established religion. Dispensing generally available, neutral funds to
a church would neither violate the Establishment Clause nor threaten
individual religious freedom, regardless of how the church spends
that money. To the contrary, the fair distribution of those funds
would further the cause of diversity by not punishing groups simply
because of their religious affiliation. In other words, it would affirm
the principle of pluralistic neutrality.
C. Pluralistic Neutrality and Public Displays of Religious
Symbols

Unlike with public aid to religion, the Supreme Court has not
found consensus yet on the proper level of neutrality to apply where
the state acknowledges religion with a symbolic display. This is an
area of fertile ground, where the European Court’s approach can be
instructive. First, this section briefly addresses the status of religious
displays under case law in the United States. It then engages in a full
discussion of the European Court’s Lautsi v. Italy case, which
illustrates on several levels the problems and potential solutions for
dealing with religious symbolism under a pluralistic neutrality
approach.
1. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Approach 185

As a result of the Supreme Court’s display cases, religious
symbols that retain their sacred meaning are being systematically

185

A full treatment of this complex topic cannot hope to be
accomplished in this short space. Thus, this section seeks only to sum up the
current U.S. situation and focus on points of comparison for useful lessons from
Europe.
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purged from the U.S. public square, especially by the lower courts.186
In contrast, the European Court recognizes—just barely,
perhaps187—what U.S. courts seem to have forgotten: that
“inculturation”188 of religion has enriched society throughout history,
and that removing religion from culture does violence to society’s
identity.189 Recently, with a more conservative majority on the
Supreme Court, some scholars believe the Court is now “moving in
similar directions” as the European Court in this area.190 The
Supreme Court, however, is yet to embrace a truly pluralistic
neutrality approach on this issue.
The first two prongs of the Supreme Court’s controversial
Lemon test are largely responsible for the removal of religious
symbols from publicly owned lands and buildings in the United
186

See Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 616 F.3d 1145 (10th Cir. 2010),
cert. denied, Utah High. Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 565 U.S. 994 (2011)
(removing memorial cross for troopers); Skoros v. City of New York, 437 F.3d
1 (2d Cir. 2006) (removing crèche); Bannon v. Sch. Dist. of Palm Beach Cty.,
387 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2004) (removing symbols in mural); Fleming v.
Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918 (10th Cir. 2002) (removing symbols
on school tiles); Harris v. City of Zion, Lake Cty., Ill., 927 F.2d 1401 (7th Cir.
1991) (removing city emblems); see generally Amanda Reid, Private Memorials
on Public Space: Roadside Crosses at the Intersection of the Free Speech
Clause and the Establishment Clause, 92 NEB. L. REV. 124 (2013) (discussing
state of case law).
187
Without doubt, the European Court has struggled to maintain
Europe’s connection to its past and to prevent secularism from negating its
“inherited cultural and moral identity,” which causes it to “become a civilization
‘that does not understand itself.’” Calo, supra note 28, at 269 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
188
Gedicks & Annicchino, supra note 84, at 86-87.
189
See Danchin, supra note 35, at 13 (noting that “the culture and
historical traditions of national groups have been shaped, to varying degrees, by
particular religious traditions”).
190
Katie A. Croghan, Lautsi and Salazar: Are Religious Symbols
Legitimate in the Public Square?, 41 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 507, 510 (2013);
see also Witte & Arold, supra note 12, at 52 (listing six teachings that they
believe the U.S. Supreme Court holds in common with the European Court in
this area); see generally Marie Elizabeth Roper, Secular Crosses and the
Neutrality of Secularism: Reflections on the Demands of Neutrality and its
Consequences for Religious Symbols—The European Court of Human Rights in
Lautsi and the U.S. Supreme Court in Salazar, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 841
(2012) (comparing the Lautsi case with the Salazar case).
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States.191 The first prong of that test requires that a state has “secular
legislative purpose” when displaying a religious symbol on
government property.192 Using this prong, the Court has found
Establishment Clause violations when officials sought to generally
recognize or promote religion through a symbolic display, such as a
monument to the Ten Commandments.193
The test’s second prong requires that a display’s “principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion.”194 This prong does not take into account a religious
display that may actually have a secular purpose. Under this version
of neutrality, the Court will still strike down a display if it has the
primary effect of advancing religion, such as displaying a crèche that
recognizes “Christmas in a way that has the effect of endorsing a
patently Christian message: Glory to God for the birth of Jesus
Christ.”195 Due to this prong, it is no longer possible for the state
truly to acknowledge the core of any religious event, no matter how
valuable the community finds it, and no matter how many centuries
the state has acknowledged it ceremonially.196
Thus, under the modern Supreme Court’s display cases, the
only permissible way for the state to acknowledge a religious event
or doctrine is to sanitize its religious aspects, morphing it into a
primarily secular thing—such as making Christmas mostly about
191

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
Id. at 612.
193
McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (removing
10 Commandments from courthouse due to purpose prong); Stone v. Graham,
449 U.S. 39, 40–41 (1980) (removing display from public schools despite the
legislature’s belief there could be a “secular application” of the 10
Commandments due to its place “as the fundamental legal code of Western
Civilization and the Common Law” of the U.S.).
194
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
195
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 601 (1989).
196
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 674-75 (1984) (The Supreme
Court has recognized the “unbroken history of official acknowledgment by all
three branches of government of the role of religion in American life from at
least 1789. . . . Our history is replete with official references to the value and
invocation of Divine guidance in deliberations and pronouncements of the
Founding Fathers.”).
192

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol30/iss1/2

54

2017

Religion Lessons from Europe

97

trees, gifts, snowmen, and red-nosed reindeer.197 No doubt, under
this test a religious display will survive judicial scrutiny, but only if it
is stripped of its core religious meaning. Far from pluralism, this
type of jurisprudence only furthers the current trend toward “the
violence of uniformity.”198 A far better approach would be to adopt
Justice Scalia’s position that the mere “acknowledgement of the
Creator” or “[i]nvocation of God” by the state “is not an
establishment” of religion.199
To a lesser degree than in the United States, the European
Court has also struggled with the issue of symbolic religious
displays. The key case in this area is Lautsi & Others v. Italy, which
journeyed through three distinct phases—the first in the Italian
courts, the second in a lower Chamber of the European Court, and
the third in that Court’s Grand Chamber.200 These phases illustrate
the struggle over religious symbols and the distinct choices that
courts face on this matter.
2. The Lautsi Case in Italy: The De-Meaning of Religious Symbols

The Lautsi case stemmed from an 1860 royal edict that
predated the unification of Italy (but which was continued by
governments throughout later stages of Italian history), requiring that
the crucifix—a Christian (primarily Catholic) symbol that displays
the body of Jesus Christ hanging on the cross—be hung in Italian

197

See generally id. (permitting the display of a crèche among secular

symbols).

198

Calo, supra note 28, at 277 (noting also the “impoverishment” of
marginalizing “particularistic commitments”).
199
McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 899–900 (2005)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing also that his position would not marginalize nonmonotheistic religious adherents because they would still be “entirely protected
by the Free Exercise Clause, and by those aspects of the Establishment Clause
that do not relate to government acknowledgment of the Creator”).
200
Phase I consisted of rulings by the Italian national courts. Phase II
resulted in Lautsi & Others v. Italy, 2009-II Eur. Ct. H.R. (“Lautsi I”), a
decision by a chamber of the European Court. This chamber ruling was
overturned by the Grand Chamber in Phase III in Lautsi & Others v. Italy, App.
No. 30814/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011) (“Lautsi II”).
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state-run classrooms.201 In 2002, Soile Lautsi and her husband
challenged the practice of displaying the crucifix, arguing that they
intended to raise their two teenage boys in accordance with the
principle of secularism, and that the presence of the crucifix in the
boys’ state-run school was contrary to that practice.202
Italy historically had set up Catholicism as the only religion
of the state; however, a 1985 Concordat with the Vatican had
changed that practice, essentially turning Italy into a pluralist secular
state.203 According to the Italian courts, “the principle of secularism
was derived from the [Italian] Constitution . . . [and] implied not that
the State should be indifferent to religions but that it should
guarantee the protection of the freedom of religion in a context of
confessional and cultural pluralism.”204 After considering the case of
the Lautsi family, Italy affirmed the right of the state to hang
crucifixes in state-run classrooms.205 This decision was challenged
by Ms. Lautsi at the European Court of Human Rights, in Lautsi I
and II.
Prior to Ms. Lautsi’s appeal to the European Court, the
national courts gave the victory to the state by turning the crucifix
into a symbol of Italian civilization.206 The highest administrative
court reasoned that the crucifix “was compatible with the principle of
secularism” because it:
[S]ymbolised the religious origin of
values (tolerance, mutual respect,
valorisation of the person, affirmation
of one's rights, consideration for one’s
freedom, the autonomy of one’s moral
conscience vis-à-vis authority, human
201

Lautsi & Others v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. at para.

17 (2011).

202

Id. paras. 10-12.
Id. para. 22.
204
Id. para. 23.
205
Id.
206
Id. para. 16.
203
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solidarity and the refusal of any form
of discrimination) which characterised
Italian civilisation. In that sense,
when displayed in classrooms, the
crucifix could fulfil—even in a
“secular” perspective distinct from the
religious perspective to which it
specifically
referred—a
highly
educational symbolic function.207
Thus, to justify the crucifix, the courts “devalue[d] its
religious significance and, indirectly, endorse[d] the principle that a
symbol can be displayed in a public institution only if the symbol has
no religious character.”208 They transformed a religious symbol into
a secular civic symbol.
This reasoning is similar to a strain of the Establishment
Clause argument in the United States that would allow the state to
promote only a hybrid kind of “civil religion”—a “thin, nationalistic
deism believed necessary, and constitutionally permissible, for public
ceremony and for the expression of patriotism,” which is “regarded
by most Americans to be a . . . bastard relation.”209 While perhaps
well-intentioned, this theory is counter-productive in a society that
truly values pluralistic neutrality. The “transformative” process of
“desacralizing” religious symbols and “reconstructing” them so that
they “belong[] to everybody”210 actually harms the cause of religious
pluralism because it “dilute[s] the authentic testimony of religions
and believers who are already estranged from Western culture.” 211
207

Id.
Silvio Ferrari, State-Supported Display of Religious Symbols in the
Public Space, 52 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 7, 16-17 (2013).
209
Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Why Are We Talking About Civil
Religion Now: Comments on “Civil Religion in Italy: A ‘Mission Impossible’?”
by Alessandro Ferrari, 41 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 877, 879 (2010); see also
Alessandro Ferrari, Civil Religion in Italy: A “Mission Impossible”?, 41 GEO.
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 839, 839-40 (2010) (noting civil religion’s attempt to
reconcile rules of democracy with “warm contributions of all religions to social
cohesion”).
210
Beaman, supra note 25, at 80.
211
See Gedicks & Annicchino, supra note 84, at 139.
208
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3. The Lautsi Case at the Lower Chamber: Intolerant Secularism at
Work

When the Lautsi case finally arrived at the European Court,
one of its lower chambers considered whether the display of a
crucifix in state-run classrooms violates the ECHR.212 The lower
Chamber rejected Italy’s suggestion to consider the crucifix as a
neutral and secular symbol in the classroom. The Court agreed that
“the symbol of the crucifix” has a number of meanings, but it
concluded that “the religious meaning was predominant.”213 The
Chamber viewed the crucifix as a “powerful external symbol” of
Catholicism—much like the prohibited Islamic headscarf in the
Swiss Dahlab case214—that may be “emotionally disturbing for
pupils of non-Christian religions or those who professed no
religion.”215
In this light, the lower Chamber found a violation of both the
right of education and the freedom of religion, because the judges
could not see how displaying a religious symbol “could serve the
educational pluralism which is essential for the preservation of
‘democratic society’ within the Convention meaning of that term.”216
The Chamber reasoned that “the compulsory display of a symbol of a
particular faith in the exercise of public authority” violated the rights
of parents and students and was “incompatible with the state’s duty
to respect neutrality in the exercise of public authority, particularly in
the field of education.”217
212

In addition to claiming a violation of freedom of religion (ECHR,
Art. 9), Lautsi also raised her challenge to the crucifix under a principle of nondiscrimination (ECHR, Art. 14) and the right of parents to “ensure such
education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical
convictions” (ECHR, Prot. 1, Art. 2). The chamber resolved the issue using the
right to education and freedom of religion. Lautsi & Others v. Italy, 2009-II Eur.
Ct. H.R. at para. 79.
213
Id. para. 51.
214
See supra notes 112-117 & accompanying text (discussing the
Dahlab case).
215
Lautsi & Others, 2009-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at paras. 54-55.
216
Id. para. 56.
217
Id. para. 57.
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The Lautsi I ruling in the lower Chamber was a partial
victory for intolerant secularism.
Moreover, the Chamber’s
reasoning was compatible with the U.S. Supreme Court’s approach
under the Establishment Clause,218 despite the lack of a similar
clause in the ECHR. Negative reaction to the Lautsi I ruling was
immediate, especially by the “sizeable number of European countries
and people that support displays of religious affiliation in public
spaces” because they view their religious symbols “to be a part of
their cultural heritage.”219 Nor were Europeans the only people who
noted this relationship between the crucifix, history, and culture.220
The lower Chamber’s decision was problematic on several
fronts. First, the judges did not appreciate the diversity of churchstate models in Europe, failing to distinguish the lighter Italian form
of secularism from French laïcité.221 The Chamber’s position would
have forced all European nations “to follow the French secular

218

See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (permitting the
Commandments on the lawn of the Texas State Capitol among 17 memorials
and 21 historical markers); see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984)
(permitting a crèche among secular symbols, including a Christmas tree and
snowmen).
219
William L. Saunders, Does Neutrality Equal Secularism? The
European Court of Human Rights Decides Lautsi v. Italy, 12 ENGAGE: J.
FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GRPS. 170, 173 (2011); see also Maret, supra note 82,
at 606–07 (noting that Europe was historically “marked by a distinctly Christian
identity . . . [that] ‘served as a medium of cultural cohesion for groups otherwise
separated by language and ethnic traditions’”).
220
Legislators in Québec, Canada, unanimously rejected the
recommendations of a report to remove a crucifix in the “Blue Room” of the
National Assembly. Then-premier Jean Charest explained: “The Church has
played an important role in Québec’s history and the crucifix is the symbol of
that history.” Beaman, supra note 25, at 73.
221
Gedicks & Annicchino, supra note 84, at 98-99 (noting that Italian
laicità “emerged in the wake of the 1984 Villa Madam Accords between Italy
and the Holy See, which transformed Italy from a confessional to a secular state
but expressly recognized Catholicism as part of Italy’s ‘historical heritage’”).
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model, and suppress all signs of religious identity as non-neutral.”222
This would not have been a victory for pluralism, but intolerant
secularism. Second, the lower Chamber “appeared to assert a
preference for symbols segregated from their religious background
over those symbols whose religious theme could not be so
removed.”223 This policy would have exerted pressure on memberstates to drain religious meaning from their future symbols. Finally,
as the Grand Chamber would later recognize, the lower Chamber’s
reasoning did not appreciate the distinction between active and
passive religious symbols.224
4. The Lautsi Case at the Grand Chamber: A Pluralistic Neutrality
Approach

After the outcry against the Lautsi I ruling, the Grand
Chamber of the European Court took up the case and reversed.
While some saw the reversal “as a capitulation of the European court
to Christian European lobbies,”225 or as a blow to minority
religions,226 it is better viewed as a victory against a form of
secularism that cannot tolerate religious symbolism in public culture.
In reversing, the Grand Chamber found “no European
222

Prélota, supra note 31, at 787. As the Grand Chamber found in
Lautsi II, this would have been a problem in many member-states in the Council
of Europe, seeing as some required such symbols in public schools—such as
Italy, Austria, Poland, and parts of Germany and Switzerland—while others
allowed the practice in their public schools, like Spain, Greece, Ireland, Malta,
San Marino, and Romania). See Lautsi & Others v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06,
Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 27 (2011).
223
Croghan, supra note 193, at 524.
224
See generally Rob Lamb, When Human Rights Have Gone Too Far:
Religious Tradition and Equality in Lautsi v. Italy, 36 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM.
REG. 751, 766-67 (2011) (criticizing the Lautsi I Court’s conclusions on the
crucifix as a passive symbol of persecution and disrespect).
225
Prélota, supra note 31, at 784.
226
See Maret, supra note 82, at 610-11 (arguing that Lautsi II
“perpetuate[s] the marginalization of minority religions in Italy” and “excludes
individuals and groups whose historical, religious, or cultural traditions are
different from those recognized by the State”); see also Romero, supra note 54,
at 84–94 (criticizing Lautsi II for being untrue to the neutrality principle).
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consensus on the question of the presence of religious symbols in
State schools,” due to the diversity of church-state models present
throughout Europe.227 The Grand Chamber acknowledged, however,
that the ECHR required the European Court to “safeguard the
possibility of pluralism in education” by requiring the state to convey
information about religion in the school curriculum “in an objective,
critical and pluralistic manner . . . free of any proselytism . . . [or]
indoctrination that might be considered as not respecting parents’
religious and philosophical convictions.”228 The Grand Chamber
also agreed with the lower Chamber that “the crucifix is above all a
religious symbol,” noting that “whether the crucifix is charged with
any other meaning beyond its religious symbolism is not decisive at
this stage of the [C]ourt's reasoning.”229
In light of the lack of European consensus and the Court’s
need to give a wide margin of appreciation to member-state policies
on matters involving religion, the Grand Chamber ruled in favor of
Italy and the hanging of the crucifixes. The Court found that the
lower Chamber had not sufficiently weighed the State’s interest in
the context of the religious culture of the State, where Catholicism
had played a crucial historical role in binding together the unified
nation of Italy—“a country without a common language and without
a widespread culture capable of founding civic engagement.”230
Recognizing the unique place of the crucifix in a historical ItalianCatholic culture,231 the Grand Chamber concluded that the Italian
display of crucifixes was not a violation of the ECHR, in light of the
wide margin of appreciation due to the nation.
The next section of this Article extracts from the Grand
Chamber’s decision in Lautsi II three key considerations that can be
transferred to the U.S. Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause
jurisprudence to apply a more pluralistic neutrality principle in
227

Lautsi & Others v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. at para.

70 (2011).

228

Id. para. 62.
Id. para. 66.
230
Ferrari, supra note 209, at 841-42.
231
Id. at 854-55 (noting the crucifix might act as a symbol of an
“exclusive national ‘ethnos’ founded on its religion”).
229
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religious display cases.
5. Three Pluralistic Neutrality Considerations for the Supreme Court

If the Supreme Court continues to insist on viewing religious
display cases under the Establishment Clause,232 then the Grand
Chamber’s analysis in Lautsi II can help the Supreme Court review
those cases in a way that respects establishment limits while also
taking into account a principle of pluralistic neutrality. Three
considerations of the Grand Chamber are of particular import: (1)
whether the environment where the symbol is displayed respects
individual religious liberties; (2) whether the symbol relates to the
cultural identity of the community; and (3) whether the symbol is
active or passive.
First, the Grand Chamber looked to the environment in which
the state displayed the symbol to determine whether it might offend
individual rights.233 This is a key consideration because if a state
receives the latitude to promote religious symbols in the public
square, then it must be careful to guarantee the absolute individual
rights of religious minorities. In Lautsi II, the Grand Chamber
approved Italy’s school environment for six reasons: (1) the
crucifixes were not paired with “compulsory teaching about
Christianity;” (2) Italy did not forbid its students from wearing
religious apparel, such as “Islamic headscarves or other symbols”;
(3) “alternative arrangements” were available for minority practices;
(4) minority religious holidays were “often celebrated” in school; (5)
“optional religious education” for other faiths “could be organized in
schools;” and (6) officials were tolerant of minority religions and
non-believers.234 A similarly appropriate environment is present in
the United States, due to the robust free-exercise protections for
minority religions present at all levels of government and in the
232

See McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 899-900
(2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Clause was not intended to apply
to mere “governmental invocation[s] of God”).
233
Lautsi & Others v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. at para.
74 (2011).
234
Id. para. 74.
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courts.
Second, the Grand Chamber considered whether the religious
symbol related to the cultural identity of the community.235 This is a
point that U.S. Supreme Court Justices have certainly made for
decades about religion and culture in the United States, although
some scholars remain skeptical that religious symbols can be part of
a “cultural marketplace” with “everyone able to participate on an
equal footing.”236 In the case of the crucifix in Italy, the Grand
Chamber noted the “great diversity” between European nations “in
the sphere of cultural and historical development.”237 Applying a
wide margin of appreciation, the Court deferred to Italy’s view that,
“the presence of crucifixes in State classrooms, being the result of
Italy’s historical development, a fact which gave it not only a
religious connotation but also an identity-linked one, now
corresponded to a tradition which they considered it important to
perpetuate.”238
The U.S. Supreme Court should emulate this deference when
considering the place of the symbols in the community that erected
the religious display, just as it considered the history and tradition of
a practice when upholding legislative prayer.239 Justice Breyer’s
“legal judgment” theory in Van Orden v. Perry did something of this
sort by focusing on the long history of the Ten Commandments
monument erected at the Texas State Capitol.240 Further, as
Professor Michael McConnell has argued, in a truly pluralistic
culture, symbols will not be oppressive:

235

Id. paras. 67-70.
Beaman, supra note 25, at 90 (arguing that, in this cultural space,
“there is no evidence” that “[h]istorical privilege and power sedimentations”
will disappear, “leaving a space in which ideas are debated and exchanged
freely”).
237
Lautsi & Others v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. at para.
68 (2011).
238
Id. para. 67.
239
See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983); see also Town of
Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014).
240
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 700-02 (2005) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in judgment).
236
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If a city displays many different
cultural symbols during the course of
the year, a nativity scene at Christmas
or a menorah at Hannukah is likely to
be perceived as an expression of
pluralism rather than as an exercise in
Christian or Jewish triumphalism. If
the curriculum is genuinely diverse,
exposing children to religious ideas
will not have the effect of
indoctrination. . . . The same is true of
the public culture: opt-out rights
should be freely accorded, but the
general norm should be one of
openness, diversity, and pluralism.241
Third, the Grand Chamber looked at whether the religious
symbol was “passive” (as opposed to “active” presumably).242 In
other words, the Court was interested in the level of proselytizing
furthered by the religious symbol. The Court disagreed with the
lower Chamber’s comparison of the crucifix in Lautsi to the Islamic
headscarf in Dahlab, noting that “a crucifix on a wall is an
essentially passive symbol [that] . . . cannot be deemed to have an
influence on pupils comparable to that of didactic speech or
participation in religious activities.”243 This Article previously
criticized the Dahlab case as a negative example of intolerant
secularism.244 The Grand Chamber’s attempt to distinguish it here
does not ring true—a headscarf is essentially a passive display placed
upon a person; thus, it should have been equally allowed in the Swiss
classrooms. While a teacher’s proselytizing words might be active,
her passive headscarf is not.
241
242

McConnell, supra note 53, at 193.
Lautsi & Others v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. at para.

72 (2011).

243

Id. The Grand Chamber viewed the facts of Dahlab as too different
to be a relevant point of reference in the Lautsi case. Id. para. 73.
244
See supra notes 112-117 & accompanying text (criticizing the
Dahlab case).
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Of the three factors considered by the Grand Chamber, this
one comes with the most cautionary warning before being adopted
by the U.S. Supreme Court. Not all scholars agree that a
passive/active distinction is valid when it comes to religious
symbols.245 Moreover, this third factor could be problematic in the
same way that the Supreme Court’s current Establishment Clause
cases seek to determine how an “objective observer” might view a
religious display246—a practice fraught with peril, as Justice Scalia
pointed out.247 Still, perhaps this factor could serve well as a
replacement to the objective observer analysis because it takes into
consideration the depth of proselytization that might occur due to the
presence of a publicly supported religious display. Depending on the
context, this factor might even weigh against an “active” monument
such as the Ten Commandments, which the Supreme Court has
concluded might “induce the schoolchildren to read, meditate upon,
perhaps to venerate and obey, the Commandments.”248
D. Pluralistic Neutrality and Other Acknowledgments of Religion

As with the acknowledgment of religious symbols, the U.S.
Supreme Court also struggled for consistency in cases involving
245

Beaman, supra note 25, at 88 (“Although passivity does not
necessarily equate to ‘no meaning,’ the implication of the court’s conclusion in
Lautsi II is that such a passive symbol does not equal indoctrination or teaching.
The work of Riis and Woodhead would suggest otherwise.”).
246
McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 862 (2005) (“The
eyes that look to purpose belong to an ‘objective observer,’ one who takes
account of the traditional external signs that show up in the ‘text, legislative
history, and implementation of the statute,’ or comparable official act.”).
247
See also id. at 901 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is an odd
jurisprudence that bases the unconstitutionality of a government practice that
does not actually advance religion on the hopes of the government that it would
do so. But that oddity pales in comparison to the one invited by today’s analysis:
the legitimacy of a government action with a wholly secular effect would turn
on the misperception of an imaginary observer that the government officials
behind the action had the intent to advance religion.”) (citation omitted).
248
Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42 (1980) (striking down Ten
Commandments in a school environment); but see id. at 45 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the Commandments had “secular significance” and
should be allowed to be placed before students “with an appropriate statement of
the document’s secular import”).
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prayer, or religious expression, and public education. While the
Court has taken a remarkably pluralistic approach to legislative
prayer, it has towed a stricter line in other areas. In the wake of this
confused religious jurisprudence, lower U.S. courts often have
adopted strict neutrality as their default position, to the detriment of
religious liberty, history, and tradition. This section examines
European Court cases involving religious expression and religious
education that may provide insights for the Supreme Court.
1. Public Prayer and Religious Expression

The U.S. Supreme Court has spoken with conflicting voices
about prayer and religious expression by public officials and staterun organizations. On the one hand, the Court—candidly admitting
that its usual Establishment Clause tests are unsuited for dealing with
legislative prayer—has developed a deferential “history and
tradition” test that takes into account whether the Framers viewed a
public religious practice as merely “a benign acknowledgment of
religion’s role in society.”249 The Court has concluded that:
The inclusion of a brief, ceremonial
prayer as part of a larger exercise . . .
is but a recognition that, since this
Nation was founded and until the
present day, many Americans deem
that their own existence must be
understood by precepts far beyond the
authority of government to alter or
define and that willing participation in
civic affairs can be consistent with a
brief acknowledgment of their belief
in a higher power, always with due
respect for those who adhere to other
beliefs.250
249

Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 U.S. 1811, 1819 (2014) (applying
the history and tradition test to approve expressly sectarian prayers prior to city
council meetings, if given by members of the community).
250
Id. at 1827-28.
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On the other hand, the Court has applied a non-deferential
test in public schools to strike down prayers that boast a similar
lineage in history and tradition.251 Thus, the Court has viewed a
school’s authorization of a rabbi’s short, non-denominational
graduation prayer as the equivalent of a “state-created orthodoxy [or
a] state-sponsored religious exercise that puts at grave risk that
freedom of belief and conscience which are the sole assurance that
religious faith is real, not imposed.”252 In this area, the Court has
embraced strict neutrality.
In contrast, the European Court has never decided a case
involving the propriety of prayer by a public official or prayer at
official events. The ECHR does not have an Establishment Clause
and does not contemplate that mere prayer by a state actor or in a
public ceremony could violate individual human rights. Article 9 of
the ECHR guarantees the “[f]reedom to manifest one’s religion or
beliefs”253—it does not limit the manifestation of those beliefs by
state officials. This focus promotes true pluralism, which accepts the
religious identity of all people and does not repress the expression of
that identity, even by its public officials. Indeed, “official religious
expression may bolster religious freedom by affirming, if only
symbolically, that religious beliefs are relevant to public life: that the
public square is not naked of religion, and that religious arguments
are part of the pattern of debate in a pluralistic society.”254
While the issue of legislative or school prayer does not find
its complement in the European Court’s jurisprudence, that Court has
provided guidance in other areas involving religious expression and
the actions of public officials. Specifically, the European Court has
decided several cases where the state has impaired religious
expression or association—a situation much more likely to result in
establishing a state religion than a few words spoken by a graduation
speaker merely acknowledging the importance of faith in life’s
251

See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (striking
down student-initiated prayer before football game); see Lee v. Weisman, 505
U.S. 577, 577 (1992) (striking down non-denominational graduation prayer).
252
Lee, 505 U.S. at 592.
253
ECHR, supra note 7, art. 9.
254
Berg, supra note 27, at 35.
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special moments. A few case comparisons should illustrate three key
points.
First, public officials have the absolute right to religious
belief and expression—a right not open to regulation by the state or
its courts. In Buscarini and Others v. San Marino, the Grand
Chamber of the European Court rejected a policy in San Marino—a
tiny microstate located within the boundaries of Italy—that forced
newly elected members of parliament to swear a religious oath “on
the Holy Gospels,” as required since 1909.255 The European Court
found that San Marino had violated Article 9 because the oath policy
was “tantamount to requiring two elected representatives of the
people to swear allegiance to a particular religion.”256 In this case,
without the benefit of an Establishment Clause, the European Court
applied a pluralistic neutrality rationale to reach essentially the same
result as the U.S. Supreme Court in Torcaso v. Watkins, where the
Justices rightly rejected Maryland’s requirement that its political
officials affirm belief in God in order to serve public office.257 In
both cases, the state improperly used its power to coerce public
officials into accepting a state-approved creed. The lesson of these
decisions is that the state cannot force its officials to forfeit their
religious rights simply because they have chosen to become public
servants.
Second, while public officials may believe and pray as they
wish, their beliefs cannot translate into actions that impair the
religious rights of others. For instance, in Hasan and Chaush v.
Bulgaria, the government replaced Hasan—the “Chief Mufti” of the
Bulgarian Muslim Community—with a candidate who had
previously held the post, and then the state refused to register the
religious group led by Hasan.258 Rejecting Bulgaria’s claim that its
255

Buscarini v. San Marino, 1991-I Eur. Ct. H.R. As in Lautsi, the state
attempted to win by draining any religious meaning from the oath. The Court,
however, rejected San Marino’s argument that the oath had “lost its original
religious character.” Id. para. 32.
256
Id. para. 34.
257
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
258
Hasan v. Bulgaria, App. No. 30985/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2000).
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actions were merely “of a declarative nature” to help bring unity to
the religious community, the Court found an Article 9 violation.259
Similarly, in Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v.
Moldova, government officials refused to recognize what they
believed to be a “schismatic” Orthodox Christian sect that would not
reconcile with a larger, state-recognized Orthodox Church.260 The
European Court concluded that these actions violated Article 9,
finding the officials had improperly assessed “the legitimacy of
religious beliefs.”261 Both of these cases are consistent with the U.S.
Supreme Court’s ruling in Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church,
which nullified a Georgia law that required a jury in a church
property dispute to decide which side of the dispute was more
faithful to the religion’s tenets.262 Other cases could also illustrate
this comparison.263
Third, public officials may not allow their personal religious
beliefs to stand in the way of accommodating others in the exercise
of their religion. The classic example of this principle in the United
States is the case of Sherbert v. Verner, where the Free Exercise
Clause required a state to give unemployment benefits to a Seventh
Day Adventist who was fired for refusing to work on her Sabbath

259

Id. para. 82.
Metro. Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R.
261
Id. para. 123. The violation occurred in a concededly difficult
environment—Moldova had recently emerged from the Soviet Union and this
dispute may have been a proxy clash between Russia and Romania. Id. para.
111.
262
Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969). The Court found that “First
Amendment values are plainly jeopardized when church property litigation is
made to turn on the resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious
doctrine and practice.” Id. at 449.
263
Compare Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993)
(finding a violation when public officials prosecuted a Jehovah’s Witness for
proselytizing in an attempt to protect the Greek Orthodox majority religion),
with Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (striking down a state statute
that required licenses for those soliciting for religious purposes), and
Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150,
150 (2002) (striking down an ordinance that required door-to-door religious
advocates to obtain a permit).
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day.264 In that case, it did not matter whether state unemployment
officials accepted the legitimacy of the woman’s refusal to work
based on her religion; the Supreme Court prohibited those officials
from treating her refusal as “good cause” for dismissal.265
Likewise, in the consolidated case of Eweida and Others v.
The United Kingdom, the European Court held that state officials
must at times accommodate certain religious practices, such as the
wearing of a Christian cross.266 Nadia Eweida was an employee of
British Airways—a private airline operating in the United Kingdom
(U.K.)—who, as a Christian, wished to wear a cross necklace outside
her uniform.267 Her co-applicant, Shirley Chaplin, was a Christian
nurse working at a U.K. state hospital who was ordered to take off
her cross necklace when the hospital mandated new uniforms with a
V-neck.268 Although Eweida worked for a private employer, the
European Court found that Article 9 included in it a “positive
obligation” on public officials to “sufficiently secure” individual
religious rights.269 In Eweida’s case, British Airways had changed
its policy based on public opinion and had not presented a strong
enough reason to prevent the cross display, especially where the
company had already accommodated other religious symbols, such
as Islamic headscarves.270 In Chaplin’s case, however, the cross
posed a safety hazard in the hospital environment—a much stronger
reason for this rule.271 In accord with the European Court’s wide
margin of appreciation, it found that the U.K. officials were best
positioned to determine safety policies on a hospital ward.272
In sum, a more pluralistic neutrality principle would permit
264

See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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266
See Eweida and Others v. The United Kingdom, 2013-I Eur. Ct.
265
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269
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See Eweida and Others v. The United Kingdom, 2013-I Eur. Ct.
H.R. at paras. 99-100.
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public officials and offices to acknowledge religion with prayer and
other religious expression, within reason. This would not violate the
Establishment Clause either—as the legislative prayer cases
demonstrate—especially outside the context of the public schools.
“The Framers were indeed opposed to coercion of religious worship
by the National Government; but, as their own sponsorship of nonsectarian prayer in public events demonstrates, they understood that
‘[s]peech is not coercive; the listener may do as he likes.’”273 The
Supreme Court should follow Europe’s lead in focusing on the
actions of public officials, while permitting maximum flexibility in
their religious expression.
2. Religion and Public Education
The role of religion in public education is the final topic to
consider in this Article. As discussed in the prior section, the
Supreme Court continues to turn a harsh eye toward schoolsponsored prayer. In fact, the Court typically applies its strictest
neutrality in cases involving religion in elementary or secondary
public education. This repeatedly has been the case in the postEverson Establishment Clause era, with the Court finding it
unconstitutional for schools to pray before class,274 to read from the
Bible,275 to prohibit instruction on evolution,276 to teach creation
science,277 to display the Ten Commandments,278 and to pray at
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Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 642 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(quoting American Jewish Congress v. Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 132 (7th Cir.
1987) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting)).
274
See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (no moment of silence
intended for voluntary prayer); see also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (no
state-composed school prayers).
275
Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (no starting
school day with a Bible reading).
276
See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (no law prohibiting
the teaching of evolution).
277
See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (no law requiring
the teaching of creation science).
278
See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42 (1980) (no law requiring
display of Ten Commandments).
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school events.279 In fact, the Court has approved religious-related
practices only where schools have blatantly discriminated against
religion-based clubs280 or where they have authorized students time
during the school day to receive private religious instruction offcampus, as in Zorach v. Clauson. 281
Not surprisingly, the European Court’s jurisprudence is more
tolerant of public religious education—concerned mostly that the
state conduct classes in a pluralistic manner with respect for the
beliefs of students and parents. This makes sense: if religion is good
for society, then the state should be able to encourage morality,
pluralism, and religious practice through its education system, as
publicly run schools did for centuries in the United States until the
Supreme Court ended the practice in the 1960s. Just as important,
however, is the corollary principle that students should have the right
to opt out of religious education, if they so desire.
The Supreme Court can gain insight from European Court
cases in this area, and should realize that its Establishment Clause
jurisprudence has room for moderation by applying a more
pluralistic neutrality principle. For instance, in Folgerø and Others
v. Norway, the Grand Chamber of the European Court considered the
validity of a Christian public education class, in a nation where the
Evangelical Lutheran Church is the state-established religion.282
Norway had always offered a Christianity class in its public schools;
however, in the 1990s it made that class more pluralistic,
encouraging open-mindedness.283 As a result, Norway tightened its
requirements on when a student could be exempt from participating
in that class. Specifically, parents must now provide a note
279

See Lee v. William, 505 U.S. 577 (no graduation prayer by guest
speaker); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (no student-led
prayer prior to football game).
280
See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001)
(requiring fair treatment of school clubs).
281
See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (permitting release offcampus for religious instruction); McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203
(1948) (forbidding release to on-campus classrooms for religious instruction).
282
Folgerø and Others v. Norway, 2007-III, Eur. Ct. H.R.
283
Id. paras. 9, 15.
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explaining in detail why their student needed the exemption.284
Some parents complained, however, that the exemption requirements
were improper and onerous.285
In its judgment against Norway, the European Court affirmed
the right of nations to teach religion in their public schools, subject to
student exemption.286 The Court applauded Norway’s attempt to
transform a purely religious class into one that better stressed
pluralistic principles.287 The Court agreed, at least in theory, that the
state could more strictly enforce attendance at a truly objective
pluralistic class.288 It faulted Norway’s class, however, for not
presenting Christianity in a sufficiently objective manner, and for
containing blatantly religious activities, such as prayer.289 Thus,
Norway’s exemption criteria was too strict, in light of the class’
religious content.290 The Court believed that the stricter note
requirement improperly obligated parents to reveal potentially
intimate details about their private lives, and it worried that the state
might still deny exemptions.291 The Grand Chamber concluded that
the ECHR required Norway to grant full exemptions to every student
who objected to the class, without resort to an onerous exemption
process.292 The Court decided related issues in cases from Poland293
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and Turkey.294
The Supreme Court should learn from these European
decisions that religion can play a role in public education and that
progressive nations can respect individual rights while providing
religious courses to achieve valid societal interests. The Supreme
Court in Zorach saw the benefit to society in permitting religious
education during public school hours, although the Court did require
that all religion classes be conducted off-campus by private
teachers.295 Further, the Court has stated that the Bible “may
constitutionally be used in an appropriate study of history,
civilization, ethics, comparative religion, or the like.”296 This
analysis is not too far removed from the European Court’s cases in
this area. While the Establishment Clause might not permit the state
to expend significant tax dollars on a doctrinal religion course, surely
a more pluralistic neutrality principle would allow the Court to
rethink much of its public school precedents.
Why not allow schools to encourage willing students to pray
during the school day and at school events? A society that values
pluralism should not teach students that prayer is a dangerous
practice to be avoided in public at all costs. And what harm can
come from allowing schools to present alternative theories to
evolution, if done in a clinical and non-proselytizing manner?
Pluralistic societies should not shelter students from theories on the
origin of life solely because they find their genesis in the Book of
Genesis, or in a philosophy that recognizes an Intelligent Designer.
294

See Mansur Yalçin and Others v. Turkey, 2014-II Eur. Ct. H.R. In
this case, members of the Alevi Islamic sect complained about Turkey’s
religious education class, which was required for all Muslims, but exemptable
for Jews and Christians. They claimed the course was steeped in Sunni Islamic
doctrine, which was offensive to the Alevi. The European Court found that
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para. 76.
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Finally, why not encourage students to read from scriptural works as
a source of inspiration or reflection? Pluralism should be as willing
to expose students to the works of Jesus and Mohammed, as it is to
encourage them with the wisdom of Ghandi or Maya Angelou. In
short, if the Supreme Court were to adopt a more pluralistic
neutrality principle, it would see that its modern Establishment
Clause jurisprudence in this area has been unnecessarily strict and
ultimately harmful to the values of pluralism.
VI. CONCLUSION

Traditionally, religion has brought great benefits to society by
developing culture and morals, and by providing a common source
of unity to diverse peoples. Although the influence of religion is
waning in Europe, the mark of faith on that continent’s history and
culture has given its courts a unique perspective that can benefit the
U.S. Supreme Court in its quest to interpret the Religion Clauses of
the First Amendment. Case law from the European Court of Human
Rights demonstrates to the Supreme Court how a pluralistic
neutrality principle can enrich the American society and harness the
value of faith in the public sphere, while at the same time retaining
the vigorous protection of individual religious rights.
The unfortunate alternative to a jurisprudence built around
pluralistic neutrality is the inevitability of intolerant secularism—an
increasingly militant separation of religious ideals from the public
life, leading ultimately to a repressive society that has no room in its
government for religious citizens. Under that regime, adherents of
both majority and minority religions suffer for the cause of secular
values. The results of intolerant secularism are seen in a recent series
of negative cases decided by the European Court of Human Rights,
which largely are a product of the deference the Court must give to
secular nations under its margin of appreciation doctrine. These
cases illustrate how highly secularized nations can trample the
fundamental rights of religious citizens for the sake of secular
ideals—preventing these peace-loving citizens from dressing in
religious garb, engaging in age-old sacrificial rituals, and following
their consciences. The Supreme Court can avoid this type of
intolerance in the United States by distancing itself from the principle
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of strict neutrality that the Court often has repeated in its
Establishment Clause cases.
A better path for the Supreme Court is to emulate a series of
positive cases from the European Court of Human Rights that
demonstrate pluralistic values. These cases show the value that
religion can bring to public life, and the ability of progressive nations
to welcome religious diversity into the public square without
harming individual rights. If the Supreme Court embraces this
European-style principle of pluralistic neutrality, it can continue
down its current path with regard to public aid to religion through
generally available, neutral funding programs. More significantly,
accepting pluralistic neutrality will result in a moderation of the
Supreme Court’s religious display cases, allowing the state to
promote meaningful symbols that are part of the community’s
identity and sense of culture. Similarly, a pluralistic neutrality
principle will strengthen the benefits of other public
acknowledgments of religion—such as prayer by public officials and
religious values in public education.
The net result of this shift in the Supreme Court’s focus—
without sacrificing the value and purpose of the Establishment
Clause—would be to promote the cause of religious pluralism in the
United States and to enhance the dignity of the American people to
live out their religious faith in the community insofar as they choose
to do. This can only be done, however, if the Supreme Court reforms
its view of the Religion Clauses and learns a few lessons from its
European brethren about the blessings of a more pluralistic principle
of neutrality.
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